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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: POSTCONVICTION
REMEDY FOR STATE PRISONERS
CURTIS R. REITZ t
Of all the many dark corners of the law, few are so dimly lit as is
the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under which federal courts pass
upon the constitutional validity of state criminal prosecutions.1 Here
many important developments are occurring, with all the hazards of
walking in the dark. For several years there has been almost constant
pressure from state judges and prosecuting officials for the abolition
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1951, LL.B.
1956, University of Pennsylvania. The author collaborated with Professor Caleb
Foote of the University of Pennsylvania Law School in an unpublished memorandum
dated March 5, 1959, treating some aspects of the subject of this Article.
1 The statutory basis is 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958). The particular reference here
is to § 2241(c) (3). The federal habeas corpus power extends, of course, beyond
litigation involving state prisoners. While most federal prisoners will use the pro-
cedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), in lieu of habeas corpus, the federal writ
may be sought by persons in varying forms of detention, principally aliens in federal
custody, e.g., Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957), and prisoners sentenced by
a court-martial, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This Article is concerned
exclusively with the state prisoner cases, which provide the overwhelming bulk of
federal habeas corpus cases. See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE
431 (1949).
The jurisdiction to issue the federal writ on application of state prisoners dates
from the Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. For the history of the juris-
dictional statutes, see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1236-37 (1953).
Under § 2241(a), the federal writ of habeas corpus can be granted by "the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within
their respective jurisdictions." The most important courts excluded are the courts of
appeals. This Article is concerned almost entirely with federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings initiated in the district courts. The appellate courts and judges have seldom
exercised their power to entertain an original application. See HART & WECHSLER,
op. cit. supra 1243-47 (1953).
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or severe curtailment of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.' Con-
gress is about to pass a statute making important modifications in the
present system.3 These developments open fundamental questions of
the necessity for and significance of the federal jurisdiction in the ad-
ministration of state criminal laws. Necessarily they question also the
manner and effect of the exercise of the jurisdiction by the federal
courts.
The pervading atmosphere is of entire lack of understanding. The
pages of the Congressional Record evidence it.4 State and federal
judges of long experience have expressed open incredulity toward the
most elementary aspects of federal habeas corpus.' A recent Sixth Cir-
cuit decision, Wooten v. Bomar,' exemplifies the confusion.
Affirming denial of the writ sought by a Tennessee prisoner, that
court's per curiam opinion rests on a completely erroneous statement
of three well-established, fundamental principles of habeas corpus prac-
tice. The Sixth Circuit said: (1) that the issue of admissibility of a
coerced confession cannot be the subject of collateral attack by writ of
habeas corpus in a federal court; 7 (2) that the petitioner had had a
determination of the voluntariness of his confession in the Tennessee
courts and "it is, therefore, not a proper question to be raised in a
habeas corpus proceeding"; 8 (3) that petitioner was not entitled to
federal habeas corpus because, although he had "exhausted his remedy
on appeal in the State courts of Tennessee, . . . he did not exhaust
the alternative remedy of habeas corpus in those courts." '
The first proposition is preposterous on its face. Federal habeas
corpus proceedings dealing with state convictions are necessarily in the
form of collateral attack on the prior state judgment. To deny that
so basic a deprivation of due process as conviction by the use of a
coerced confession can be made the subject of a collateral attack is
in effect to destroy the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. The scope
of that jurisdiction, as declared by Congress, extends to any state
prisoner "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States." "0 The Sixth Circuit did not cite this statute.
2 See notes 31, 307-09, 314 infra and accompanying texts.
3 This proposed statute is discussed in text accompanying notes 307-46 infra.
4 105 CoNG. REc. 13358-65 (daily ed. July 29, 1959); 104 CONG. REC. 4147-54
(daily ed. March 18, 1958); 102 CONG. REC. 935-40 (1956).
5 Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subconmittee No. 3 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at 4, 12 (1955).
6 267 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
7Id. at 901.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. This last point was nominated as a "further objection to this action in
the federal courts" and should not be classed as a holding.
1028 U.S.C. §2241(c) (3) (1958).
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Nor, apparently, was it aware of the Supreme Court decision in Leyra
v. Denno," a federal habeas corpus case which held precisely that a
coerced confession is the proper subject of collateral attack in federal
habeas corpus."
The Sixth Circuit's second proposition is as wrong as its first. It
is a fundamental principle of the federal practice, now codified in sec-
tion 2254 of the Judicial Code, 3 that constitutional issues arising out
of state criminal prosecutions should be presented first to state courts.14
It is equally fundamental that the state courts cannot, under the present
statute, have the last word. This is the teaching of the Supreme Court
in the leading case in federal habeas corpus practice, Brown v. Allen. 5
It is exemplified by the holding in Leyra v. Denno, where the Court
made its independent evaluation of the issue of coercion, even though
that issue had been litigated in the state courts.
The third proposition (the court obviously missed the incongruity
in asserting simultaneously that a state prisoner must exhaust state
remedies before coming to the federal court and that review in a state
court precludes review by the federal court) is completely in error on
the application of the exhaustion rule. It has long been settled that a
prisoner need not make repeated applications to the state courts on the
same question. Once the state court decides against the prisoner on the
merits of his contention, the exhaustion rule is satisfied."6 This is a
square holding of Brown v. Allen.
The exact converse of the three propositions of the Sixth Circuit
opinion would serve to sum up the basic procedural precepts of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction.17 The "substance" concerns the protections
11347 U.S. 556 (1954).
12 See also United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 908 (1958) ; Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956), affirming Giron v. Cranor, 116 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash.
1953) ; United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 896 (1955).
1328 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). This provision was enacted in the 1948 revision of
the Judicial Code as the culmination of a study instituted by the Judicial Conference
of the United States in 1942. 1 MooRE, FEDEAL PRACTICE 0.230[2], at 2707 (2d ed.
1959).
14 The history of the doctrine is described in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204-14
(1950).
15 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See particularly the separate opinion of Justice Frank-
furter. Id. at 488, 497-502.
16 The possibility of the state court changing its decision is too remote to require
what could be an infinite series of applications. At common law, the doctrine of res
judicata was not applicable to habeas corpus judgments. See Salinger v. Loisel, 265
U.S. 224, 230-31 (1924). See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950); 2
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 827 (5th ed. 1925).
17 partial explanation for the quality of this Sixth Circuit opinion may lie in
the absence of counsel on behalf of the petitioner. The report indicates that he moved
pro se. With a few rare exceptions, prisoners are abjectly ignorant on the law of
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embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses as applicable
to the administration of state criminal law. The rapid development of
the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court in the past twenty
years is familiar knowledge to many."8 Far less generally appreciated
is the impact which this development has had on the processes for im-
plementing the guarantees defined by the Court.
The natural tendency of thought is to relate the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants to the prosecution stage and immediate
appellate proceedings to which these rights pertain. It might seem
obvious that this is the setting in which the federal issues would be
raised and determined. State courts are bound under the Constitution
to follow "the supreme Law of the Land." " And where such a federal
question arises in a state proceeding, the opportunity is presented to
the defendant to seek review of the state judgment in the Supreme Court
of the United States.
20
The image of this process for vindication of fourteenth amendment
rights gives the impression of being complete and satisfactory. The
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction accordingly appears an unnecessary
overlap and duplication. There are two fundamental reasons why this
is not true.
First, the ultimate right of a state criminal defendant to have a
federal court and federal judges pass upon his federal contentions 2'
cannot be secured solely by the Supreme Court's power to review state
judgments. The sheer volume of cases is enough to preclude it.
Second, it is not true that the original conviction proceedings pro-
vide a forum for the vindication of all federal constitutional rights. For
many state prisoners, the only avenue to raise their contentions is by
way of collateral attack on a prior conviction. Because of the gross
inadequacy of the postconviction procedures in most states, the federal
habeas corpus remedy is the only possible forum for adjudication of
these rights.
habeas corpus. The pastime of self-education in the law is becoming increasingly
common in penal institutions (Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1956)), but the handicaps under which the prisoners work
would be intolerable to even an experienced lawyer.
18 See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal
Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 213 (1959) ; Schaefer, supra note 17.
19 U.S. CONST. art VI.
2028 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958). Most of the cases will come under the certiorari
provision, § 1257(3). The right of appeal is limited to cases in which a state statute
is challenged as unconstitutional and the decision in the state court upholds the statute.
Section 1257(2). E.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
21 This right is derived from the federal statute conferring upon the federal courts
habeas corpus jurisdiction over prisoners in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3)
(1958). Congress presumably is not obligated to establish this jurisdiction; it dates
back only to 1867. See note 1 supra.
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It is not difficult to understand why so many of these cases neces-
sarily involve collateral attack. In some instances, the facts to support
the claim are not and cannot be known at the time of the original trial.
This is true, for example, when the prosecution has suppressed evidence
favorable to the defendant 22 or knowingly used perjured testimony.'
Errors of this kind, if they are discovered at all, usually come to light
after conviction. But the one factor which contributes most to the
necessity for collateral attack is the lack of counsel to represent the ac-
cused. The Supreme Court has not yet declared that the states must
provide counsel for indigents in all serious cases.24 The absence of
counsel is in itself the most frequently found constitutional defect in
state prosecutions.25 At the same time, it contributes to the under-
standable failure of unrepresented defendants to know and to raise con-
stitutional claims in the proceedings leading to conviction, whether on
plea of guilty or full trial. Even where counsel is appointed by the trial
court, frequently there is a failure to pursue state appellate remedies
because the appointment is believed to lapse.2
Nor is it difficult to explain the ineffectiveness of postconviction
remedies in the state systems. The narrow common-law writ of habeas
corpus, which the states incorporated into their jurisprudence, is totally
incapable of encompassing the modern issues of due process and equal
protection. The writ tested only the jurisdiction of the authority im-
posing restraint, and the concept of jurisdiction for this purpose was
22 See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
23 See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
2 4 No case has yet posed the question under the equal protection clause, propelled
into prominence by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The possible application
of the Griffin rule to appointment of counsel in criminal cases is discussed by Judge
Hamley in The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois on State Court-Federal Court Relation-
ships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 79 (1959).
25 See note 119 infra and accompanying text.
20This practical difficulty in the established system for appointment of counsel
came to the fore in recent litigation in the District of Columbia. Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Leave To Appeal In Forma Pauperis, Campbell v. United
States, Misc. No. 1048, D.C. Cir., Sept. 1958. See Note, Legal Aid to Indigent
Criminal Defendants in Philadelphia and New Jersey, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 812, 829-32
(1959) (N.J. RULE 1:12-9(b) provides that duties of assigned counsel end after
sentencing); D.C. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE CommIssioN oN LEGAL Am 106-07
(1958) ; Kadish & Kimball, Legal Representation of the Indigent in Criminal Cases
in Utah, 4 UTAH L. Ray. 198, 217 (1954). See also Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp.
671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956).
Another factor contributing to the use of postconviction remedies is the retroactive
operation of constitutional decisions. State prisoners may have spent many years in
jail before any precedent is established that their convictions were obtained in violation
of the Constitution. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (1938 con-
viction-state habeas corpus); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F.
Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (1924 conviction-federal habeas corpus). Compare the
incredible logic of United States ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill.
1959) (1936 conviction). The difficulty of retroactive effect of constitutional de-
cisions was discussed by Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 25-26 (1956).
1960]
466 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108:461
extremely limited." It would not reach the elements of procedural fair-
ness found in the fourteenth amendment. In addition to this restricted
scope, the writ was available only for defects which appeared on the
face of the record.28  Collateral inquiry into questions of fact-almost
indispensable to establish the truth or falsity of claimed denials of due
process or equal protection---could not be accomplished under this writ.
And other common-law remedies, particularly the writ of error coram
nobis, are equally unavailing, in their traditional limitations, to provide
a means for vindication of modern constitutional rights.29 Some of
the most difficult and painful litigation in federal habeas corpus has
involved the tension between the requirement of exhaustion of state
remedies and the doubts and confusion which surround the collateral
attack procedures of the states.30
I. PROCEDURES IN THE STATE COURTS
The major objection to the present habeas corpus jurisdictio. of
the lower federal courts is summed up in a 1952 resolution of the Con-
ference of State Chief Justices: "orderly Federal procedure under our
dual system of government should require that a final judgment of a
State's highest court be subject to review or reversal only by the Su-
preme Court of the United States." "' The expressed intention was
to preclude lower federal tribunals from engaging in "review or re-
27 1 BAILEY, HABEAS CoRPus AND SPECIAL R mtmEs §§ 29-33 (1913); CHURCH,
THE WRrr OF HABEAS CoRPus §§ 362-76, especially § 368 (2d ed. 1893); 4 ENcYc.
Soc. Sci. 233-36 (1937); Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657, 660-62 (1948).
28 1 BAILEY, op. cit. supra note 27, at § 34; CHURCr, op. cit. supra note 27, at § 379.
29 See the brief but excellent description of the historical scope of this extraordi-
nary writ in the opinion of Judge Joseph Sloane, quoted in Commonwealth ex rel.
Spader v. Myers, 190 Pa. Super. 62, 152 A.2d 787 (1959). See also FRANK, CoRAM
NOBIS ch. 1 (1953).
8
0 Undoubtedly the outstanding single series of cases is the famous Hawk litiga-
tion. For over twelve years Hawk tried without success to get a hearing in state and
federal courts. The former refused habeas corpus and coram nobis relief while the
latter relied upon failure to exhaust state remedies. When Hawk finally was accorded
a hearing in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, he was freed from custody. Hawk v.
Hann, 103 F. Supp. 138 (D. Neb. 1952), vacated and remanded for dismissal, 205
F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1953) (on appeal by the state, Hawk's death, after argument but
before decision on the merits, held to render case moot requiring vacation of judgment
and dismissal of case). See the history of this case recounted in HART & WECHSLER,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 1297-98. The state which was most frequently involved in
the tangle of confusion over the existence and scope of postconviction remedies was
Illinois. Highlights of that period are found in United States ex rel. Bongiorno v.
Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 865 (1945) ; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) ; Woods v. Nierstheimer,
328 U.S. 211 (1946); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) ; Loftus v. Illinois, 334
U.S. 804 (1948); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); Willis v. Ragen, 338 U.S.
944 (1950).
31 Quoted in Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Conference of
Chief Justices, Aug. 14, 1954, printed in H.R. REP. No. 1293, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1958).
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versal" of state judgments in criminal cases. This purpose would
be carried out by narrowing the scope of the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction.
A proposal to limit federal scrutiny of constitutional issues arising
in state criminal prosecutions to Supreme Court review of state judg-
ments demands consideration of the quality of the state processes. To
the extent that state procedures are inadequate--or worse, nonexistent
-the power of Supreme Court review is frustrated. Curtailment of
the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under such circumstances would
seriously diminish the meaningfulness of federal guarantees for state
prisoners.
Where a state provides no remedy at all for the constitutional
claim, the Court has never required that the state modify its procedural
structure to create one." This has particular significance for the kind
of issue which can be posed only in the form of a collateral attack upon
a prior conviction. But even where a procedure for raising the federal
claim apparently exists in a state's jurisprudence, the capacity of the
Supreme Court to review state judgments is totally dependent upon the
building of a full, fair and accurate record in the lower courts."3 This
is true not only in collateral attack situations but also for those federal
claims litigated in the course of the original prosecution.
The Conference of Chief Justices explicitly recognized this close
interrelationship between the quality of state procedures and the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Before any change in
the federal jurisdiction could be justified, "certain corrections in exist-
32 See the pattern of Illinois cases in note 30 supra. The Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act was an indirect result of the pressure of possible federal habeas corpus
proceedings which motivated the state legislature to adopt a state procedure. See
ABA Section of Judicial Administration, Effective State Post-Conviction Procedures
-Their Nature and Essentialities, Aug. 1958 draft.
33 The dependency of the Supreme Court on the record compiled in the state
courts is dramatically illustrated in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated
and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), prior decision reaffirmed, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d
849, appeal dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question, 350 U.S. 985
(1956). For an interesting excursion by the Supreme Court in an attempt by cor-
respondence to gather together a record, see the discussion of the Dick case in note
293 infra. See also Sheffield v. Louisiana, 348 U.S. 850 (1954), in which the Court
obtained directly from the Louisiana Bar Association a copy of a committee study and
report criticizing the conduct of Sheffield's trial. The Court denied certiorari without
prejudice to an application for federal habeas corpus in both the Dick and Sheffield
cases. The significance of this unusual order is discussed in text at notes 256-306
infra.
Where the state court has summarily denied an application for postconviction
review, the Supreme Court may be able to pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations,
on the assumption for this purpose that they are true, to make out a denial of con-
stitutional rights. See Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. CIaudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951);
Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945);
Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945) ;
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942);
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
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ing State court procedures" " should be made. The 1953 Conference
unanimously adopted that part of a committee report which called for
sweeping state improvements.3 5 Many of the "more efficient state
procedures" 3 it advanced related to improvement of the original trial
process in order to make direct appellate review an adequate remedy for
the determination of most federal constitutional issues. Proposals fo-
cused on the necessity of counsel if voluntariness of a confession were
at issue, the inadvisability of receiving a plea of guilty "until a defendant
has had legal counsel," and the desirability of stenographically recorded
court inquiries to insure that waivers of constitutional rights are made
knowingly. 7 The report added that provision of counsel in all felony
cases, not merely when constitutionally required, would go far to "check
the flow of groundless petitions." 8
In addition to these basic trial level reforms, the Conference pro-
posed major revamping of procedures for collateral attack. They rec-
ommended a "postconviction process which is at least as broad in scope
as the procedure whereby claims of violation of constitutional right as-
serted by State prisoners are determined in Federal courts under the
Federal habeas corpus statute." " Great emphasis was placed upon the
need to simplify the tangled formalities characterizing the structure of
postconviction procedures to eliminate the technical confusion among
several different remedies. Although no specific reference was made
for provision of counsel in postconviction cases, it can be assumed that
the state jurists were aware of the fundamental importance of legal
assistance at this stage.
Measured against the standards set down by the State Chief Jus-
tices, the existing practices of most states are wholly inadequate. In
34 Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Conference of Chief Justices,
supra note 31.
35 The resolution was adopted at the Conference of Chief Justices, Boston, Mass.,
Aug. 22, 1953. The report appears in H.R. REP. No. 1293, supra note 31, at 11. See
also the Report of the Habeas Corpus Comm. of the Conference of Chief Justices,
supra note 31.
36 Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Conference of Chief Justices,
June 1953, printed in H.R. REP. No. 1293, supra note 31, at 11. The appendix to the
report noted that while earlier action of the Conference "was chiefly addressed to
alleged defects" in federal law, "more mature consideration has led to the belief that
much of the difficulty and delay in the Federal courts can only be eliminated by the
adoption of more efficient state procedures." Id. at 26. This appendix was incor-
porated by reference in the body of the report; the committee noted that its proposals
". .. are set forth briefly without argument in this report. They should be con-
sidered in the light of the material set forth at length in the appendix to the report."
Id. at 11.
37 Id. at 22-24. For an example of the results which follow from lack of counsel,
see Banmiller, A Lawyer's Responsibility to the Offender, 31 TEmp. L.Q. 111, 112
(1958).
38Id. at 23.
39 Id. at 11.
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postconviction processes the only progress has come through judicial
decisions liberalizing the scope of or practices under the common-law
writ of habeas corpus, or in cases reviving and revitalizing the writ of
error coram nobis. 40  While these are significant developments, judicial
expansion or distortion of a traditional form of action is probably not
a satisfactory response to the general problem. It does not help to un-
tangle confusion caused by a multiplicity of remedies. More funda-
mentally, it does not insure the basic requisites of a modem postconvic-
tion proceeding: a right to counsel for indigents, a full and fair hearing
on issues of fact, a complete and accurate record of the proceedings,
and a reasoned decision embodied in a written opinion.
Only a handful of states have taken a broader approach to the
need for an effective postconviction procedure. The pioneer is the well
known Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,4 adopted in 1949 under
the severe pressure of a series of Supreme Court cases involving Illinois
prisoners.42 The Illinois measure was enacted in North Carolina two
years later.3 These two states were the only ones to have acted when
the Conference of State Chief Justices resolution was adopted in 1953.
That resolution led immediately to the establishment of a special
committee on the problem by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. 4 Two years later, in 1955, the Com-
missioners adopted a Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,45 which
draws on, but substantially modifies, the earlier Illinois legislation.4
It provides an exclusive remedy to replace the confusing multiplicity
of procedures which exists in many states. More important, it re-
quires appointment of counsel for indigents, provides for appellate
review in meritorious cases for indigents without cost and with pay-
40 State ex rel. McManamon v. Blackford Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 3, 95 N.E.2d
556 (1950); Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953); Petition of
O'Leary, 325 Mass. 179, 89 N.E.2d 769 (1950); Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore.
283, 251 P.2d 87 (1953); Ex parte Bush, 313 S.W.2d 287 (Texas Ct. Crim. App.
1958); In re Homer, 19 Wash. 2d 51, 141 P.2d 151 (1943).
41 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 826-32 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958).
42 See note 30 supra.
4
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1959). See Comment, 29 N.C.L.
REv. 390 (1951).
44 COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERExFC 95 (1953).
45 
COMMISSION,1ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE 122-23 (1955). The text of the act and the committee's prefatory statement
appear in id. at 202-15.
46 The scope of the remedy may differ. The uniform act follows the federal
habeas corpus statute in providing relief for anyone sentenced "in violation of the
Constitution of the United States" (§ 1), while the Illinois provision requires that
the petitioner show "a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 826 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958). See Jennings v. Illinois, 342
U.S. 104 (1951). In addition, the Illinois provision contains a five-year statute of
limitations. Section 826.
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ment to be made for legal services, and requires that the courts state the
grounds upon which the case was determined. The uniform act has
not experienced widespread favorable response as yet. Only three states
have taken action upon it: Maryland, which passed it with some
serious modifications; " Arkansas, which adopted it in 1957 " and
repealed it in 1959; " and Oregon, whose 1959 legislature enacted a
substantial reworking of it.5"
These developments are a notable start toward reform in a few
states,51 although it is probably too early to evaluate the effectiveness
in operation of the new legislation.5" Particular attention should be
given to practices that develop with respect to several basic and difficult
problems which have not been satisfactorily resolved in the terms of
the statutes themselves.
None of them adequately meets the need of indigents for counsel
above the trial level of postconviction proceedings.53 An untutored
47 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A-J (Supp. 1959). The principal change is the
Maryland provision making appellate review of the judgment discretionary. Section
6451. The Maryland statute was amended in 1959 expressly to permit summary
denials, without appointment of counsel, of second or repeater applications. Section
645H. Unlike the uniform act, Maryland provides that the postconviction proceedings
shall not be conducted before the same judge who presided at the original trial unless
the petitioner consents. Section 645G.
48 Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-3101 to -3110 (Supp. 1959).
49 Ark. Acts 1959, No. 227, § 1. The reason for the sudden repeal is not known,
but the Bailey case, raising questions of jury discrimination against Negroes, may be
the explanation. Bailey v. State, 313 S.W.2d 388 (Ark. 1958), cert. denied without
prejudice to an application for federal habeas corpus, 358 U.S. 869 (1958).
50 Ore. Laws 1959, ch. 636. A major change introduced in the Oregon law is
the provision that the venue for postconviction proceedings ordinarily shall be in the
county where the petitioner is imprisoned (§ 6); the uniform act specifies that the
court of conviction is the place for the collateral proceeding as well. UNIFORM POST-
CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 3. The Oregon solution reduces the expense and cus-
todial difficulties in bringing the prisoner to court for a hearing and reduces the
possibility that the original trial judge, or one of his immediate colleagues, will pass
upon the postconviction petition. Cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645G (Supp. 1959).
Related to the venue point is the provision in the Oregon statute which makes it
mandatory that the prisoner be brought to court for a hearing on his application unless
the decision turns solely on a matter of law (§ 12). Oregon has expanded considerably
on the effect to be given to prior judicial proceedings (§ 15). The Oregon law also
contains the novel provision that, in the event a new trial is ordered, the transcript
of the first trial can be used for the testimony of witnesses who have died or are
unavailable (§ 20).
51 In addition to the legislative reform described in the text, mention should be
made of the adoption of a postconviction procedure in Delaware by rule of court.
It takes the form of a motion to correct or vacate sentence and permits review of
sentences challenged as having been imposed in violation of the United States Con-
stitution. DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRiu.) R. 35.
52But see ABA Section of Judicial Administration, Effective State Post-Convic-
tion Procedures-Their Nature and Essentialities 25-37, Aug. 1958 draft, for an
appraisal of the Illinois act.
53 The appointing power is the trial court, a provision which raises the same
difficulty as to appeals or other subsequent proceedings found generally when counsel
are provided by court appointment. None of the statutes has the provision in the
uniform act (§ 5) that compensation shall be paid for legal services in a state appel-
late court. Even this provision does not cover certiorari to the Supreme Court. See
note 26 snpra and accompanying text.
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layman is particularly out of his element in an appellate court. More-
over, it is open to question whether the new statutes properly handle
the assignment of counsel at the trial level. The statutes imply that
at least the first petition from every indigent prisoner will be trans-
mitted to court-appointed counsel.-4 This could entail a severe, and
perhaps unnecessary, burden upon the bar. While it is an improve-
ment over the current federal practice which throws the burden of
sifting the petitions upon the federal judges or their law clerks, there
are alternatives which deserve exploration. A public or voluntary
defender could be charged to represent prisoners in cases of possible
merit.5 A branch of a legal aid society at the prison might advise
inmates on this as well as other legal problems.56 An even more
radical approach would be to permit law students, under appropriate
supervision, to represent indigent prisoners. 7 These solutions would
achieve continuity of counsel at all levels of proceeding while minimizing
the burden on lawyers, inexperienced in matters of criminal law, who
might be appointed under an assignment system.5"
5 4 All the statutes tie the appointment of counsel to the fact of indigency, which
must be pleaded by the prisoner in the first instance. Failure to allege that the
petitioner is without funds and desires assignment of counsel may result in disposition
of the case on the petition drawn by the prisoner.
The extent to which the lower federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings appoint
counsel for the pleading, as distinguished from the hearing stage, is unknown. A
study of the docket of the Supreme Court indicates that on petitions for certiorari
there is a significantly higher percentage of cases with attorneys of record coming
from the federal habeas corpus courts than in cases coming from state collateral
proceedings. See note 75 infra and accompanying text. This data is, of course, only
indirect evidence of the practices of the respective courts as to assignment of counsel
at the various stages of the proceedings. One district judge indicated recently that
in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) it was his practice to scrutinize petitions
filed pro se very carefully, while petitions filed by counsel were automatically set
down for hearing. United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D.D.C.
1959).
55 This possibility has been totally overlooked in two important recent develop-
ments concerning public defenders. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted a Model Defender Act at their August 1959 meeting.
The act limits the defender to representation of indigents under arrest or charged
with a crime. UNIFORM MODEL DEFENDER ACT § 2. A bill before Congress to establish
a defender system for the federal courts is also blind to the needs of indigent prisoners
seeking collateral relief. S. 895, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., adopted by the Senate, 105
CONG. REc. 7705 (daily ed. May 20, 1959).
56 E.g., the Legal Aid Bureau at Lincoln, Nebraska, operated by the College of Law
of the University of Nebraska, processed 172 cases during the year ending September 1,
1957, including 28 "penitentiary cases." Proceedings of the House of Delegates of
the Nebraska Bar Associatio, 1957, 37 NED. L. REv. 1, 39 (1958).
5 7 E.g., the Legal Aid Clinic of the Southwestern Legal Foundation at Southern
Methodist Law School appeared on behalf of a Texas prisoner in petitioning for
certiorari. Massey v. Moore, 338 U.S. 837 (1949), denying cert. to 173 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1949). Since the director was not a member of the bar of the Court, the official
report indicates that Massey moved pro se.
5 8 But see the enthusiastic response of one attorney to his experience as court-
appointed counsel for an indigent prisoner who won his freedom in federal habeas
corpus. Roemer, Court Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Appellant, 3 Colum. L.
Alumni Bull., Oct. 1958, p. 1.
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Another problem left unresolved by the new statutes is the standard
by which a petition drafted by a prisoner is to be evaluated. These
acts contain extraordinarily strict pleading requirements which are
well beyond the capacities of most prisoners. 9 Even if the first peti-
tion is virtually automatically assigned to an attorney appointed by the
court, there will be many instances of more than one application from
the same prisoner. Some of these will have merit.60  Yet certainly
not all repeater applications can be sent to a lawyer for rewriting. It
remains to be seen what techniques the state courts will evolve to deal
with this difficult situation.6
Despite their defects, the new postconviction acts represent a strik-
ing advance. By comparison, the situation which obtains in many
states is deplorable. Professor Austin Scott, Jr., has recently published
a criticism of the conditions in Colorado. 62 A state-by-state study of
the quality of postconviction procedures would undoubtedly show that
Colorado is not atypical. There is not only indifference to reform but
outright hostility toward development of postconviction remedies. The
latter attitude is perhaps illustrated by a statement of the Chief Justice
of the Ohio Supreme Court 63 in testimony before a congressional com-
mittee: "Our penitentiary has as many curbstone lawyers as any other
state penitentiary, but we at least have a consistent record in Ohio that
we have never allowed one of these writs of habeas corpus." " If it is
a matter of pride that no prisoner has ever obtained relief, the state
postconviction process is worthless.
59 UNIFORM POsT-CONvICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 4.
6 0 All of these statutes have a provision that all claims must be presented in the
first application for relief, on penalty of waiver of omitted claims. UNIFORX POST-
CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 8; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 828 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645H (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218
(Supp. 1959) ; Ore. Laws 1959, ch. 636, § 15. The uniform act, Maryland and Oregon
recognize expressly that such a waiver rule cannot, without injustice, be made abso-
lute. For application of the Illinois provision, see People v. Orr, 10 Ill. 2d 95, 139
N.E.2d 212 (1957) ; People v. Lewis, 2 Ill. 2d 328, 118 N.E.2d 259 (1954) ; cf. People
v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950). A recent case arising under the Maryland
statute is Roberts v. Warden, 156 A.2d 891 (Md. Ct App. 1959).
6 1 Maryland amended its statute to provide that a second application for relief
from the same prisoner can be dismissed without the appointment of counsel. See
note 47 m.pra. Cf. Plummer v. United States, 260 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
62 Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 249 (1959).
63 The statement of Chief Justice Weygandt is especially significant in light of
the important role he has played in the Conference of Chief Justices. At the time of
his testimony, Chief Justice Weygandt informed the committee that he was appearing
as chairman of that group. Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at 12 (1955).
64 Id. at 13.
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II. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court of the United States occupies a dual position
on matters of state criminal law. It is the highest federal court and all
cases arising under the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction can theoret-
ically reach it. The remarkable fact is that very few such cases have
ever been decided on the merits by the Court.65 Most of the Court's
opinions in state criminal cases have been written in the exercise of its
power to review federal questions involved in state judgments which
either affirmed the original conviction or denied collateral relief within
the state system.Y6
The requirement that a state prisoner exhaust his state remedies
before seeking federal habeas corpus insures that most cases will be
presented to the Supreme Court for review of a state judgment before
any federal habeas corpus proceedings can be instituted.6 7  Not only
must the state prisoner pursue his own state's processes to the highest
court of the state but, under the rule of Darr v. Burford,6 8 ordinarily
he must also seek certiorari to the state court prior to application for
federal habeas corpus. The Supreme Court has accepted the principle
that it, rather than the lower federal courts, has the responsibility to
review state judgments in criminal matters wherever necessary.!9
65 Since October 1949, there have been 15 federal habeas corpus cases in which
the Court has published an opinion. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); United
States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S. 276 (1959) ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S.
156 (1957) ; United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956) ; Chessman
v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955) ; Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) ; Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556 (1954); United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952);
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340
U.S. 206 (1951); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). During the same period
there have been several times this number of Supreme Court opinions in state criminal
cases on review of a state court judgment.
66 It is this channel of review which, in the opinion of many state judges, is the
only proper method of federal court supervision of federal questions arising out of
the administration of state criminal law. See text at note 31 supra. The chief justices
of the states do not approve of the Supreme Court's practice of independent evaluation
of the factual issues underlying constitutional questions. In their view, the Court
should be bound by the facts as found by the state trial court, subject to the normal
rule of limited appellate review of fact questions. See the criticism of Moore v.
Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) in CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, REPORT OF THE
ComMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS AS AFFECTED BY JUDIcIAL DECISIONS
19-21 (1958).
6728 U.S.C. §2254 (1958).
68339 U.S. 200 (1950). "It is this Court's conviction that orderly federal pro-
cedure under our dual system of government demands that the state's highest courts
should ordinarily be subject to reversal only by this Court and that a state's system
for the administration of justice should be condemned as constitutionally inadequate
only by this Court. From this conviction springs the requirement of prior application
to this Court [for certiorari] to avoid unseemly interference by federal district courts
with state criminal administration." Id. at 217.
69 Id. at 216-17.
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The proposal to abolish or curtail the federal habeas corpus juris-
diction would radically alter the position of the Supreme Court. To-
day it stands institutionally in a pivotal role at the end of state court
litigation and at the beginning of litigation in the federal courts."0 To
the extent that the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is diminished, the
Supreme Court would become the terminus rather than the pivot in this
litigation. Many cases are now reaching the federal habeas corpus
stage after having been denied review by the Court. In a considerable
number of these, the claim of the state prisoner is found to have merit. 1
A scheme that would shift to the Court the exclusive responsibility for
federal scrutiny in these cases accordingly raises the question whether
that Court has the ability to exercise a greater supervision over state
criminal judgments than it currently provides.
The Number and Character of the Petitions
The best answer to the question is found in an examination of the
number and quality of the applications for relief filed by state prisoners
in the Supreme Court and of the practices followed in handling and dis-
posing of them. No one knows how many state judgments in criminal
cases are rendered each year with potential grist for Supreme Court
action in the form of a constitutional or federal question. Until a short
time ago there was not even any reliable information on the number of
these cases actually presented to the Court. But a recent study compiled
in the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court shows that, during a
two and one-half year period, the Court disposed of 1,234 cases involv-
ing state prisoners seeking review of state judgments.72 Only some 18
per cent of these were cases coming directly from the state appellate
court's affirmance of conviction. The great bulk sought review of a
state judgment in a state collateral attack proceeding.73
70 In Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), the Supreme Court indicated that the
petition for certiorari was not part of the state procedure. Id. at 680. Two years
later, in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 212 (1950), the Court said: "It is immaterial
whether as a matter of terminology it is said that review in this Court of a state
judgment declining relief from state restraint is a part of the state judicial process
which must be exhausted, or whether it is said to be part of federal procedure. The
issue cannot be settled by use of the proper words."
71 See text accompanying note 225 infra.
72 This study, made by Michael Rodak, Jr., Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Court
of the United States, and Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, is as yet unpublished. It covered the 1956 and 1957 Terms
of the Supreme Court and the 1958 Term through February 1959. Rodak & Spaniol,
Preliminary Report of a Study of the Dockets of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Relation to Federal Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, March 1959 (unpublished).
73The 1,234 cases were broken down as follows: direct review of the conviction
-220; state collateral attack-,014. During the same period 318 federal habeas
corpus cases involving state prisoners were disposed of: 116 petitions for certiorari
to lower federal courts and 202 applications for original writ in the Supreme Court.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
It is generally known that the legal and literary quality of most
of these petitions is exceedingly poor. They are usually typewritten
and frequently are written by hand, sometimes in pencil. Justice
Frankfurter has described them in these terms:
"These petitions for certiorari are rarely drawn by lawyers; some
are almost unintelligible and certainly do not present a clear state-
ment of issues necessary for our understanding, in view of the
pressure of the Court's work. The certified records we have in
the run of certiorari cases to assist understanding are almost un-
known in this field. Indeed, the number of cases in which most
of the papers necessary to prove what happened in the State pro-
ceedings are not filed is striking." '
Indeed, in the Clerk's study an attorney appeared of record in only
eight per cent of the cases of collateral attack originating in a state
court. There was something in the nature of a record, the adequacy of
which was not checked, in only 18 per cent of these cases. A combina-
tion of the two factors was found in only six per cent of the petitions.75
The Court's Handling of the Petitions
Little is known about the processing which these petitions receive
inside the Court. Biographies of two recent Chief Justices reveal
something of past practices. Pusey credits Chief Justice Hughes with
an individual effort to promote the interest of the Court in petitions
from prisoners."6  He is said to have read them all personally and
brought those he deemed meritorious to the attention of his brethren.
During his tenure, there were not many petitions filed and this was not
a serious burden of work. Mason reports that Hughes' successor,
Chief Justice Stone, continued the practice of personal attention to
these applications although the steadily rising volume began to drain
his energies: "7 in his first term as Chief Justice, Stone is said to have
read 178 petitions. By contrast there were 797 petitions disposed of in
the 1957 Term of Court.
78
Recent articles by present members of the Court indicate that the
screening of these cases is no longer a strictly personal matter for the
Chief Justice. Justice Clark wrote that each member of the Court
74 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 493 (1953).
75 By way of comparison, in the habeas corpus cases coming from lower federal
courts, there were attorneys of record in 31% of the cases, a record available in 61%
of the cases and a combination of the two in 29% of the cases.
762 PUSEy, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 727-28 (1951).
77MASON, HARLAN Fisi STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 639, 788 (1956).
78 [1958] ADMINISATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN. REP. 144.
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is responsible for the decision in all of them.79 Justice Harlan described
the procedure in these terms:
"The 'Miscellaneous' petitions . . . are not in printed form, nor-
mally only one typed or handwritten copy being filed, the office of
the Chief Justice as a matter of convenience first prepares outlines
of the issues in each case for distribution to the other Justices.
These are then followed by a circulation among the Justices of the
papers filed in all capital cases and in cases presenting questions of
possible significance, the papers in all other cases being of course
available to any member of the Court desiring to examine them." o
The Court's Disposition of the Petitions
Most petitions for review of state court judgments filed by state
prisoners are summarily denied by the Supreme Court. Except for
petitions filed by the Solicitor General of the United States, the same
could be said about any class of petitioners. Each year the Court agrees
to hear on the merits some 13-17 per cent of the cases on the Ap-
pellate Docket and 1-4 per cent of the applications on the Miscellaneous
Docket.81
Of the 1,234 such cases acted on by the Court during the period
of the Clerk's study, only 127 were on the Appellate Docket.82 State
prisoners who were able to afford the expense of placing a case on that
docket fared very well in the Supreme Court. The Court rendered a
decision on the merits in 22 per cent of the cases: 12.6 per cent re-
versed or vacated and 9.4 per cent affirmed. Most of this group came
to the Court on direct review of a judgment of conviction."3
Applications for review of a state judgment on the Miscellaneous
Docket were, for the most part, denied or dismissed without considera-
tion of the merits. Twenty-five cases, representing 2.3 per cent of the
total dispositions on this docket, were noted in the Clerk's study as set
0 Clark, The Supreme Court Conference, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 273, 276 (1959).
80 Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 555 (1958).
81 [1958] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN REP. 146. The
Miscellaneous Docket was established at the 1945 Term to cover extraordinary writs
and other special types of applications. It was enlarged at the 1947 Term to include
all petitions for certiorari and appeals in forma pauperis. Petitioners proceeding in
forma pauperis are excused from paying the docket fee and any necessary costs. 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1958); SuP. CT. R. 53. The application can be filed in one copy,
rather than forty, and is usually typewritten. The Appellate Docket comprises the
regular business of the Supreme Court. The Court also has an Original Docket, on
which are cases under the Court's original jurisdiction other than those in forma
pauperis, which are placed on the Miscellaneous Docket.
82 Of the 116 petitions for certiorari to a lower federal court, 12 were on the
Appellate Docket.
83 Of the 127, 108 were on direct review of the affirmance of the state conviction.
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down for argument but no further indication is given of their outcome.8"
Counting these with the few cases summarily affirmed or reversed, the
Court passed upon the merits of 2.8 per cent of the cases. Almost
90 per cent of this group arose in a collateral attack proceeding in the
state courts.8 6
It is not difficult to suggest at least one reason for the substantial
difference in the percentage of cases which the Court decided on the
merits as between the two dockets. In all but two cases on the Ap-
pellate Docket there was an attorney representing the state prisoner
and a record filed of the proceedings in the state courts. The combina-
tion of a printed petition, prepared by a lawyer, filed on the Court's
regular docket, with a supporting record attached, means that the cases
are more clearly and effectively presented to the Court than the great
bulk of in forma pauperis petitions. The relatively high percentage of
cases reviewed is in line with the principle set forth in Darr v. Burford 
87
and indicates that, where circumstances reasonably permit the exercise
of judicial review, the Supreme Court has been diligent to pass upon
state criminal judgments. This conclusion is reinforced by the re-
latively large number of Supreme Court opinions reviewing state de-
cisions in criminal matters during the past decade. There is no reason
to believe that the Court, under existing handicaps, is not playing as
great a role in this area as is possible.
III. THE EXTENT OF CURRENT HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE IN THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The information available on current federal habeas corpus prac-
tices is appallingly scant: what is known has been accumulated largely
in the wake of the agitation for legislative change during the past few
years. The principal source of such data has been the statistics of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.88
84 When the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a case placed on the Miscellane-
ous Docket, it is transferred to the Appellate Docket unless summarily disposed of.
SuP. CT. R. 53(6).8 5 There were, in addition, eight cases in which the Court denied certiorari
without prejudice to an application for federal habeas corpus; seven of these were
on the Miscellaneous Docket. For a discussion of the qualified denial of certiorari,
see text accompanying notes 256-306 infra.
86Of the total of 1,107, 995 arose in collateral attack proceedings in the state
courts.
The federal habeas corpus cases were disposed of as follows: On certiorari to a
lower federal court, five were reversed or vacated, two were affirmed, six were trans-
ferred from the Miscellaneous Docket to the Appellate Docket and 103 were denied
or dismissed. All of the applications for original writ of habeas corpus were denied.
87 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
88 The Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts contains in tabular form the number of habeas corpus cases commenced
and disposed of in all the federal district courts, and the number and length of hear-
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The District Court Practice
During the past ten years some 6,000 petitions for habeas corpus
have been filed in the federal district courts.5 9 There has been a slight
upward trend in the number of applications each year." On the
strength of these facts, many persons have declared that the habeas
corpus jurisdiction is a severe burden on the federal judges. 1 This
overlooks the significant fact that most of these petitions are patently
frivolous and are dismissed upon first reading. An average of only 31
cases a year are given a hearing by the district courts. 2  These are
defined as cases in which there was "evidence introduced." " In the
past eight years the number has never been as high as 30; 9' during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, there were 28. By comparison, in
the same year, the district courts conducted and disposed of 4,500
civil cases and 3,600 criminal cases after trial. 5
The few hearings which are held, according to the best available
evidence, are extremely short. The study reported by Justice Frank-
furter in Brown v. Allen showed that 16 of 24 cases were concluded in
one hour or less.96 Only one of the remaining eight extended beyond
four hours. 7
ings conducted. The office reports other data for selected individual district courts
and records the number of appeals commenced in the courts of appeals. See, e.g.,
[1958] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 156, 163, 171, 191.
Similar data has been sent to Congress in connection with pending legislation. See
H.R. REP. No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-42 (1959). This data does not differentiate
state prisoners from other petitioners for habeas corpus under the federal question
jurisdiction, but the Administrative Office indicates that the "great majority" are
applications by state prisoners.
89 H.R. REP. No. 548, supra note 88, at 38.
90 The total by fiscal years was: 1949-584, 1950-560, 1951-482, 1952-541,
1953-548, 1954-597, 1955-660, 1956-734, 1957-778, 1958--755. Ibid.
91 Id. at 3; 105 CONG. REc. 13358-65 (daily ed. July 29, 1959); 102 CoNG. REc.
939 (1956) ; Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, 4, 22, 96, 100 (1955). Compare District
Judge Foley denying relief in United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 144 F. Supp.
458, 460 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, 256 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 908
(1958) : "any judge worth his salt can always find the time to read and consider them
[habeas corpus applications from state prisoners] no matter how crudely presented.
. . . But see Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 54-55 (1956).
92 H.R. REP. No. 548, supra note 88, at 39.
93Ibid. This is an ambiguous and awkward classification of cases in habeas
corpus. If it encompasses only those cases in which the federal court hears testimonial
evidence in open court, it would not adequately reflect the number of cases given
thorough consideration by the district courts on the basis of the record compiled in
state proceedings or other documentary evidence submitted to the court.
94 The figures reported are: 1951-29, 1952-25, 1953-29, 1954-20, 1955-25,
1956-19, 1957-28, 1958--28.
95 [1958] ADMINIS ATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 170, 208-09.
96 344 U.S. 443, 529 (1953).
97 The same general pattern is suggested by the Administrative Office statistics.
[1958] ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 191.
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The reports of the Administrative Office indicate that 98 petitioners
were successful in the district courts from 1946 through 1957."8 The
definition of "successful" is not given, but it almost certainly means
a final judgment granting habeas corpus relief, rather than simply a
favorable ruling on an interlocutory question. Apparently this figure
includes some judgments which have been reversed by a court of ap-
peals; the Administrative Office footnotes two instances." This is only
a partial list of court of appeals reversals,100 however, and leaves in
doubt the exact number of unreversed district court decisions granting
relief. Likewise, it is fair to assume that the figure does not take into
account reversals in the courts of appeals whereby petitioners obtain
relief.' 01
Habeas Corpus in the Courts of Appeals
The Adminstrative Office reports contain almost nothing on the
habeas corpus practice in the federal courts of appeals. These courts do
98 T.R. RaP. No. 548, supra note 88, at 37. The Administrative Office then dis-
counts the figure, stating that "in only a small number of these 98 cases were the
petitioners actually released." What is meant by "actual release" is not immediately
apparent A practice has developed whereby the federal writ is not ordered to take
effect until a period of time has elapsed during which the state can institute new
proceedings against the prisoner. See note 110 infra. Perhaps this procedure under-
lies all or part of the Administrative Office's discount.
Confusion is compounded by the further implication that less than half of the
98 successful petitioners were prisoners. "[O]f 60 petitions granted, there were only
26 petitioners who were in the custody of wardens of State penitentiaries." H.R.
REP. No. 548, mipra note 88, at 37. The purpose served in separating wardens of
state prisons from other state officials who are custodians of penal institutions is not
clear. Such a division may have the unfortunate tendency to lead to a conclusion
that the number of successful federal habeas corpus petitioners has been "exceedingly
small." Ibid.
99United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 224 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 945 (1955) ; United States ex rel. Mascio v. Ragen, 179 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1950). H.R. RP. No. 548, supra note 88, at 37.
100 See, in addition, United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 267 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1959) ; United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 252 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
with statement as to meaning of opinion of court of appeals, 357 U.S. 220 (1958) ; Mayo
v. Blackburn, 250 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958);
Graham v. Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957); Dickson v. Castle, 244 F.2d
665 (9th Cir. 1957); Utah v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 973 (1956); Cranor v. Cooper, 203 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 839 (1953) ; Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
861 (1953); Ross v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
862 (1951); United States ex rel. Parker v. Ragen, 167 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 920 (1949); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d
976 (7th Cir. 1948) ; United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 608 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948).
101 In seven cases, the court of appeals ordered the prisoner discharged. United
States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838,
850 (1959); Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958); United States
ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 908 (1958) ;
United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 873 (1957); United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d
763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); United States ex rel. Collins v.
Claudy, 204 F2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953).
1960]
480 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
not have original jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus, °2
but they have occasion with relative frequency to reverse district courts
and to order prisoners discharged.13  The reports, however, show
only the number of appeals commenced: an average of 60 per year
during the past decade, varying from 40 in 1951 to 91 in 1957.,04 They
do not reveal how many were decided nor, more important, how
they were decided.
A supplement to this sparse data on habeas corpus in the courts
of appeals is found in the number of reported opinions by these courts.
Over the past ten years, some 500 opinions and orders have been
published. 0 5 The majority of these, as expected, were dispositions in
favor of the states, including some reversals of district court judgments
in favor of the petitioner.10 6 But there were also a substantial number
of rulings favorable to the prisoner.107  Seven of the decisions ordered
the writ granted despite denial of relief by the lower court.' 8 Fre-
quently the courts of appeals reversed and remanded a case for a hearing
when the district court had summarily dismissed the petition.' The
importance of this first step to a prisoner is enormous for it means that
a court has recognized possible merit in his claims and set his case
apart from the flood of frivolous applications. It probably also means
that he can now get counsel appointed to assist him in the presentation
of his case, a matter of almost crucial consequence.
The available statistics reveal in crude outline the dimensions of
the federal habeas corpus practice. And, reasonably interpreted, they
give an approximation of the burden of work placed upon the federal
courts. They cannot, however, even begin to describe the intricate and
interdependent relationships of state and federal procedural systems
comprising the structure within which state criminal law is adminis-
tered.
10228 U.S.C. §2241(a) (1958). See note 1 supra.
103 See note 101 supra.
104 H.R. REP. No. 548, mipra note 88, at 42. This figure is broken down by
judicial circuit in the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. See, e.g., [1958] id. at 156.
105 This based upon a survey covering the Federal Reporter, Second Series,
volumes 163 through 267. During the same period, there were over 200 opinions
published by the district courts in the Federal Supplement, volumes 73 through 173.
106 See notes 99, 100 supra.
107 Some forty cases are reported in the past decade in which the courts of appeals
reversed the district courts on intermediate questions. See note 109 infra.
108 See note 101 supra.
109 E.g., United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958) ; United States ex rel. Alvarez v. Murphy, 246 F.2d 871
(2d Cir. 1957) ; Bales v. Lainson, 244 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Atkins v. Moore,
218 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1955); Henley v. Moore, 218 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1955);
United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
865 (1953) ; Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951) ; Brown v. Frisbie,
178 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1949).
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IV. A CASE STUDY OF SUCCESSFUL FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PETITIONERS
Only a detailed case study can fully reveal the actual workings of
the complex system of courts for the litigation of federal questions in
state criminal cases. In preparation for this Article, such a study was
made of a number of cases in which a federal court ultimately granted
a writ of habeas corpus. These are cases in which a state prisoner
successfully attacked the judgment under which he was confined. By
this, it is not meant that the prisoners immediately received their free-
dom, for it frequently happens that a retrial is not foreclosed to the
state.' While in a few instances, the subsequent developments of
these cases have been traced,'" the central theme has been their his-
tory prior to the federal court judgment.
The cases which form the basis for this examination were drawn
from the reported opinions of the federal courts over a period of ap-
proximately ten years." 2 Thirty-five cases,"' involving thirty-nine
persons," 4 were discovered. It must be emphasized that they do not
represent all petitioners who were accorded a remedy in federal habeas
corpus during this period. It is not known for certain what the exact
number is." 5 Nor are these cases presented as typical examples of
state administration of criminal law. They were chosen because, hav-
110 There has been an interesting practice in the nature of the remedy given
in federal habeas corpus where the defect in the prior proceedings does not preclude
a retrial. The order to give the prisoner freedom is frequently conditioned to permit
the state to institute new proceedings or correct the error in the former case. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 838, 850 (1959); United States ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d
215 (7th Cir. 1958); Robbins v. Green, 218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954); Garton v.
Tinsley, 171 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1959); White v. Dowd, 164 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Ind. 1958) ; United States ex rel. Sheffield v. Waller, 126 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. La.
1954), certificate of prob. cause denied, 224 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.), cert. under 28 U.S.C.
§1651(a) (1958) denied, 350 U.S. 922 (1955); cf. United States ex rel. Collins v.
Claudy, 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953).
1 1 1 Mullreed was retried and convicted, but there are no reported state opinions.
An original petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court was denied. Mullreed
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 807 (1957). Sheffield's second conviction was affirmed in
State v. Sheffield, 232 La. 53, 93 So. 2d 691 (1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 915 (1957).
In the Todd case the conviction was reversed and a third trial ordered. Todd v.
State, 230 Ind. 85, 101 N.E.2d 922 (1951). The New York Court of Appeals eventu-
ally ruled that the indictment against Leyra had to be dismissed. People v. Leyra,
1 N.Y.2d 199, 134 N.E.2d 475, 151 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1956). At the second trial in the
Grandsinger case, the defendant was found not guilty by jury verdict. Lincoln Star
(Neb.), Nov. 27, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
112The cases were obtained from a study of the United States Reports, volumes
338 through 360, the Federal Reporter, Second Series, volumes 163 through 267, and
the Federal Supplement, volumes 73 through 173.
113 In the discussion that follows, the cases will be referred to in text and footnote
by the name of the state prisoner only. The history of the cases, with full citation
to known published opinions, is given in Appendix, p. 525 infra.
114 There were three cases in which more than one state prisoner was seeking
federal relief. Curran (3 petitioners), DeVita (2 petitioners), Lunce (2 petitioners).
11 5 See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
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ing run the gamut of state and federal courts, they demonstrate case by
case the acute significance of federal habeas corpus.
Every case began, of course, with a prosecution and judgment of
conviction. There may have followed immediate state appellate review.
There may have been one or more collateral attack proceedings in the
state courts, and one or more unsuccessful federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Any or all of these phases of litigation may have been
capped by petitions for certiorari, although in only one of the cases
did the Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari at some preliminary
stage in the development of the litigation."1 6 Finally the stage was
reached in which relief was granted-most frequently by the district
courts, not infrequently by the courts of appeals, and once by the
Supreme Court. 117 Where a remedy awarded in a lower court judg-
ment was reversed on appeal, the case was excluded from the study.1 '
The discussion of the cases which follows treats each major phase
of the litigation separately. After a preliminary description of the
cases and the constitutional issues presented in them, the processes
in the state courts involving those constitutional or federal questions
are surveyed. This is followed by examination of the developments
which transpired in the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari to
the state courts. The discussion concludes with the federal habeas
corpus proceedings in which relief was granted.
116 Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954). The Court held that the prisoner
was entitled to a hearing on the question of insanity as that related to the competence
of the prisoner to stand trial without counsel. When the case was decided in the
district court on remand, however, the court held that Massey's conviction was void
because he was insane at the time of trial, without direct reference to the question
of counsel. 133 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Tex. 1955). In two other cases, prior to the
petitioner's prevailing in a lower federal court, the Supreme Court had denied cer-
tiorari to a state court without prejudice to an application for federal habeas corpus.
Carmen v. Dickson, 355 U.S. 924 (1958) ; Sheffield v. Louisiana, 348 U.S. 850 (1954).
This type of order is discussed in text at notes 256-306 infra.
117 This is not to imply that the same procedure was followed in every case. In
many instances, the separate stages were so numerous that it was impossible to
unravel them completely.
118 There were a considerable number of court of appeals reversals of district
court decisions in favor of the state prisoner. See notes 99, 100 supra.
Particular mention should be made of Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340
U.S. 206 (1951), in which the Supreme Court agreed with the lower federal courts
that a deprivation of due process had occurred, but vacated a judgment in favor of
the prisoner in order to permit the state courts to reconsider the case. The Indiana
Supreme Court promptly allowed a delayed appeal and granted the prisoner relief.
Cook v. State, 231 Ind. 695, 97 N.E.2d 625 (1951).
In Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), the Third Circuit granted habeas
corpus relief to a petitioner held in Pennsylvania custody to be extradited to Georgia.
The petitioner established that the conditions of the Georgia chain gang from which
he had escaped violated due process of law. This decision was reversed by the
Supreme Court, 338 U.S. 864 (1949) (per curiam), solely on the ground of failure
to exhaust state remedies. In the course of the subsequent litigation, Johnson died and
the case became moot. Letter From Hymen Schlesinger, Esq., Attorney for Johnson,
to the Author, Aug. 18, 1959.
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The Cases and the Constitutional Issues
A most striking fact discovered from the 35 cases studied is the
dominance of the issue of right to counsel as the contention most likely
to succeed in federal habeas corpus. In roughly half of the cases, the
state judgment fell on this ground." 9  As only four of these cases in-
volved a capital offense, the largest stumbling block in the adminstra-
tion of state criminal law is revealed as the nonabsolute right to counsel
for indigents in noncapital cases.
Five cases rested on a claim of the introduction into evidence of
a coerced confession. 20 Three involved prosecution suppression of
evidence favorable to the accused.' 2 ' There are several somewhat novel
decisions. One case held that deliberate perjury by a member of the
police, even without the knowledge of anyone on the prosecution legal
staff, constituted a deprivation of due process of law.' 22 Another deter-
mined that the conduct of a juror, in failing to disclose that he had
recently been the victim of a crime similar to the one charged, vitiated
the conviction." Also among the 35 cases is the well-publicized
Goldsby case from Mississippi"' in which the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a white defense attorney's intentional failure,
in the state prosecution proceedings, to charge racial discrimination in
the selection of the petit jury would not bar a Negro defendant from
119 Capital cases: Berry, Ellisor, Grandsinger, Sheffield. All except Berry had
been sentenced to death. Non-capital cases: Bland, Bowers, Garton, Green, Johns,
Lunce, Mills, Mullreed, Savini, Stoner, Todd, Woods. Some of these cases raised
other constitutional issues as well, but the counsel question seems basic. In addition
to the above, mention should be made of two Missouri cases, Houston and Montgomery
(Mo.), in which a state county court granted habeas corpus on the ground of lack
of counsel. See also the Massey case in which the Supreme Court, but not the district
court on remand, saw the controlling issue as lack of counsel. See note 116 supra.
120 Caminito, Gonzales, Leyra, Wade, White. The White case is rather difficult
to classify as to the constitutional issue present. White's confession was an adoption
of portions of a confession made by his accomplice. This contained matters with
which White could have had no personal knowledge. This, plus the fact that White's
confession came after long hours of interrogation, suggest that the district court's
rationale may have centered on coercion. But the opinion refers at length to cases
dealing with the right of confrontation and cross-examination. Perhaps the court
viewed it a denial of due process to introduce into evidence a voluntary confession
which was an adoption of the statement of another. In Mills, petitioner asserted a
coerced plea of guilty as well as lack of counsel as the basis for relief.
221 Almeida, Montgomery (Ill.), Thompson.
122 Curran. The federal courts relied upon Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942),
as standing for the proposition that complicity of the prosecutor is not a necessary
condition to the finding of unconstitutionality.
12 3 DeVita. The decision in this case seems to make the action of the juror the
action of a state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
124 This case has been linked as a motive to the lynching of Mack Parker in
Mississippi last year. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1960, p. 1, col. 5, p. 8, col. 4. The
court of appeals decision was announced on January 16, 1959. Parker was lynched
on April 25, 1959.
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raising the issue in federal habeas corpus.'25 These cases illustrate the
role that lower federal courts are playing in exploring the frontiers of
constitutional law.
Only one of the cases was decided on a nonconstitutional ground: 126
the California conviction of an Indian was upset on the claim that
the offense was triable only in a federal court by virtue of a statute in
which Congress had pre-empted jurisdiction over certain offenses by
Indians.
27
A second extraordinarily significant element revealed in these 35
cases is the extremely serious crimes for which the successful petitioners
had been convicted. Fourteen of the group had been found guilty of
murder. 23  There were altogether 17 capital cases.129  In nine, the
sentence imposed was death. 8° Fifteen of the successful petitioners
were serving sentences of life imprisonment. 3' In the 11 remaining
cases, the penalties were heavy: the mean maximum sentence was
24.8 years; the median, 25 years.3 2
The most likely explanation for the absence of lesser convictions
from the group is the time factor. There is no reason to believe that
constitutional guarantees are more rigorously followed in prosecution
of minor crimes. Except perhaps where the public outcry for retribu-
tion is great, it is natural, rather, to believe that procedural rights
would be more scrupulously observed in the handling of the more
serious offenses. But evidently it takes so long to mature a case for
federal habeas corpus that the lighter sentences are completed before
reaching that stage. This is borne out by the time lapse between con-
125 The court of appeals took judicial notice of the fact that lawyers residing in
most southern jurisdictions rarely, almost never, raise the issue of systematic exclu-
sion of Negroes from juries. It concluded that failure to challenge the petit jury
in the state court did not operate as a waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights.
263 F.2d at 82-83.
126 Carmen. The basic statute, it will be recalled, provides that federal habeas
corpus lies for state prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2241(c) (3) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
127 The statute was the Ten Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153, 3242
(1958). The California Supreme Court finally concluded that its state habeas corpus
procedure did not extend to cases not presenting a constitutional question and requiring
determination of factual issues outside the record. Application of Carmen, 48 Cal. 2d
851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957).
128 Almeida, Caminito, Carmen, DeVita, Ellisor, Goldsby, Gonzales, Grandsinger,
Houston, Leyra, Sheffield, Thompson, Wade, White.
1 2 9 Almeida, Berry, Caminito, Carmen, Curran, DeVita, Ellisor, Grandsinger,
Goldsby, Gonzales, Houston, Leyra, Montgomery (Mo.), Sheffield, Thompson, Wade,
White.
1 3 0 Almeida, Carmen, DeVita, Ellisor, Goldsby, Grandsinger, Leyra, Sheffield,
Thompson.
131 Berry, Bland, Bowers, Caminito, Curran, Gonzales, Houston, Massey, Mills,
Montgomery (Ill.), Montgomery (Mo.), Rhea, Stoner, Wade, White.
132 Collins, Daugharty, Garton, Green, Johns, Lunce (2 petitioners), Mullreed,
Savini, Todd, Westbrook, Woods. The figures in text were computed on the basis of
persons, rather than cases.
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viction and the obtaining of relief in the group of successful cases. The
longest period was 26 years.133  There were 13 cases in which the
time span was 10 years or more,"'s 24 in which it was five years or
more.
1 35
A third interesting fact about the 35 cases is their geographical
origin. Nineteen states are represented. The largest delegation came
from Pennsylvania, which contributed five cases.'36 Illinois and In-
diana had four each.137  There were three apiece from New York and
Texas, 3 8 while Michigan and Missouri each had two.1 39  It is not
surprising to find the industrial states, with large urban centers, so
heavily represented, simply as a reflection of population statistics. Yet,
except for Pennsylvania and New York, the Middle Atlantic and New
England region is the source of relatively few cases. 4 ' So, too, the
Far West shows only one case from each of the coastal states, including
heavily populated California.'" It is surprising to find so few cases
from the South, 4" particularly in light of the constitutional ramifica-
tions of the racial problem, not only involving discrimination in jury
133 Montgomery (Ill.). Petitioner was convicted of rape in 1923 and released
on federal habeas corpus in 1949. There is no record of his seeking any relief prior
to 1947 or 1948, however.
1
34 Caminto, Collins, Garton, Houston, Massey, Mills, Montgomery (Ill.), Mont-
gomery (Mo.), Stoner, Wade, Westbrook, White, Woods. Not all of these can
be attributed to a failure of the prisoner to seek relief. See especially Garton,
Massey, Westbrook.
135 In addition to the cases in note 134 supra, these were Bland, Carmen, Curran,
Daugharty, DeVita, Goldsby, Green, Johns, Lunce, Rhea, Thompson.
136 Almeida, Bowers (when the Pennsylvania conviction was used in a multiple
offender proceeding in New York), Collins, Thompson, Woods.
137 Illinois: Mills, Montgomery, Stoner, Westbrook. Indiana: Johns, Lunce,
Todd, White. Special mention should be made of the prominent place which Indiana
has in the roster of successful federal habeas corpus cases. There is much reason
to suppose that the quality of the administration of criminal law in Indiana is at
least as good, if not better, than in most states. The fact that several Indiana
prisoners prevailed in a federal habeas corpus proceeding seems rather a reflection
of the work of the Public Defender in that state. Not only does the Defender
take an active part in state collateral proceedings, itself an unusual occurrence, but he
also represents state prisoners in the Supreme Court of the United States on cer-
tiorari from the state court judgments and in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
138 New York: Caminito, Leyra, Wade. All were coerced confession cases.
Texas: Bland, Ellisor, Massey. Two other cases arose in New York when that state
took into account prior invalid convictions in other states for purposes of its multiple
offender statute. See notes 161-63 infra and accompanying text.
139 Michigan: Mullreed, Savini (when the Michigan conviction was used in a
New York multiple offender proceeding). Missouri: Houston, Montgomery (Mo.).
Both the Missouri courts followed the same pattern. A state trial court, in habeas
corpus proceedings, held their convictions void. No appeal lies in Missouri from
such an order. A second state court of similar rank, in which the convictions had
been obtained, ordered the prisoners "remanded" to prison. Thereupon, the peti-
tioners sought habeas corpus in the Missouri Supreme Court where it was denied.
140 From New England, there was one case, Green (Maine); in the Middle
Atlantic area, DeVita (New Jersey) and Curran (Delaware).
141 California: Carmen; Oregon: Daugharty; Washington: Gonzales.
142 There were no cases from the southeastern region. In Mississippi there was
Goldsby and in Louisiana, Sheffield. The border states of Kentucky and Tennessee
each had one case, Berry and Rhea, respectively.
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selection, but also the greater need for legal representation among the
poorly educated. 43
The "silent" areas present intriguing questions. Does the silence
indicate higher standards for administration of the law and a lower in-
cidence of variation from constitutional norms? Or that the states'
collateral remedies are completely adequate to provide relief to any
prisoner with a valid grievance? Or does it mean that the pastime of
legal activity has not become popular in prisons in these localities? '..
Or does it reflect the relative capacities of the prison populations to
understand the nature of their rights and the first steps they must take
alone to initiate judicial proceedings? Or does it imply that there are
perhaps prison regulations in these areas which forbid, or at least
impede, access to a court? 145
Some explanation for the regional lacunae of successful federal
habeas corpus petitions may lie in the varying attitudes of federal judges
toward postconviction claims. The court that completely misstated the
law on the basic principles of habeas corpus in Wooten v. Bomar ..
is not a forum where one is likely to find cases in which state prisoners
have prevailed. In fact, the only connection between the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the 35 successful federal habeas corpus
applications studied is one per curiam affirmance of a district court
decision in favor of the prisoner.
14 7
The attitude of inhospitality, while it will reflect openly in some
decisions like Wooten v. Bomar, has more hidden but immensely more
pervading impact in the sphere of summary treatment accorded to the
great bulk of applications drawn by state prisoners. Unless the court
passing upon these applications reads them sympathetically and with a
thorough understanding of the operation of the due process and equal
protection clauses through the federal habeas corpus procedures, the
possibility of an application receiving more than a glance is negligible.
143 The remaining two cases were Grandsinger (Nebraska) and Garton
(Colorado).
144 See Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1,
17 (1956).
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, the number of federal habeas
corpus cases commenced, by circuit, was as follows: first-12; second-132; third-77;
fourth-64; fifth--64; sixth-101; seventh-126; eighth-26; ninth-109; tenth--44.
[1958] AD iNISTmA=IV OFFiCE U.S. CoURTs ANN. REP. 164-69. This table is further
broken down by states and federal districts within states. The figures do not, of
course, reflect the volume of activity in the state courts.
145See Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959); United States
ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).146 See discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 6-17 supra.
147 Edwards v. Rhea, 238 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956), affirming 136 F. Supp. 671
(M.D. Tenn. 1955).
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It is apparent that some federal courts lack either the sympathy or the
knowledge or both. 4 "
How the Constitutional Issues Were Handled in the State Courts
The state procedures for the litigation of constitutional claims of
criminal defendants or prisoners in the 35 cases studied were extremely
poor. 4 ' Their development in the state courts is difficult to summarize
because of the many varied factual patterns found. One useful classifica-
tion, however, can be made on the basis of the disposition of the federal
claim in the highest appellate courts of the states.' 0 First, there were
11 cases which were decided by the highest state appellate court without
reaching the substance of the federal claim.'51 The disposition ex-
pressly rested on some ground other than the merit or lack of merit
in the constitutional contentions. Second, there were six cases in which
the federal claim was presented to the state's highest court, but decision
was rendered unfathomable by the absence of any opinion announcing
its basis or reasoning.152 There was a great likelihood that some or
all of these had actually been decided entirely on a matter of state law.
Third, there were eight cases in which the federal claim was never
before the highest appellate court of the state. 5 ' In a few instances,
this was attributable in part to the failure of the petitioner to present
his case, though always there was some justification for bypassing the
state process. The remaining cases in this group are explained by
various procedural hurdles blocking state supreme court review. Fourth,
and last, there were ten cases in which the state supreme court treated
the merits of the petitioner's case 14 or at least apparently did so.'5 '
148 Cf. Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 54 (1956): "Indeed, the
probability that the proportion of meritorious cases is significantly greater than
the statistics indicate suggests that what is needed is to provide more rigorous federal
judicial scrutiny rather than to confront the prisoner with new obstacles to relief."
149 Admittedly these cases were selected on the ground that they reached a federal
court and were there decided in favor of petitioners. This would exclude from con-
sideration cases in which the state courts, having perceived the merit to a prisoner's
contention, granted relief.
150 The phrase, "highest state appellate court," does not necessarily mean the
state supreme court. In this context it refers to the highest court in the state to
which a given class of cases can be appealed. See ROBERTSON & KIRXHAm, JuRrsnxc-
TION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 46-56 (2d ed. Wolfson &
Kurland 1951), for a discussion of the "highest state court" in connection with
Supreme Court review.
151 Berry, Bland, Bowers, Carmen, Garton, Goldsby, Houston, Johns, Mont-
gomery (Mo.), Savini, Todd.
152 Almeida, Ellisor, Grandsinger, Mills, Sheffield, Thompson.
153Daugharty, Gonzales, Green, Montgomery (Ill.), Mullreed, Rhea, White,
Woods.154 Caminito, Collins, Curran, DeVita, Leyra, Lunce, Massey, Stoner, Wade,
Westbrook.
155 The qualification is added because in some of these cases there was no state
court opinion announcing the basis for decision. See note 196 infra.
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In only two or three of these, however, did the quality of the state
procedure approach the minimal standards of disposition on a complete
factual record, with counsel representing the prisoner, and full appellate
review with a reasoned decision embodied in a written opinion.
One rather significant fact is that where the dispositive federal
issue was presented to the state courts, it was usually in the form of
a collateral proceeding rather than as a part of the original prosecution
and appellate review. In only five cases was that issue raised in pro-
ceedings leading to conviction. 5 ' All the other constitutional litiga-
tion in the state courts came in some type of collateral attack, including
delayed appeals or delayed motions for new trial. 7
State Court Decisions Not on the Merits of the Federal Claim
The 11 cases in this group comprise most of the written opinions
of state courts discovered among the 35 cases. It is a rather significant
commentary, perhaps, that this effort was expended on avoiding the
constitutional issues rather than deciding them directly.
There were several reasons given for the failure to reach the
ultimate merits. Eight of the group were disposed of on the ground
that the state had no collateral remedy for the kind of issue sought to
be raised. 5' A good example is the Todd case. Todd was convicted
after a jury trial at which he was not represented by counsel. The
prisoner contended on appeal, and the federal court subsequently found,
that he had sought appointment of counsel or a postponement to permit
him to retain his own counsel.' The common-law record in the trial
court recited that the defendant had elected to serve as his own counsel
and had announced he was ready for trial. The Indiana Supreme
Court refused to consider that the record might be wrong. Their
holding is summed up in the statement: "On matters of record proper
courts speak only through the record." "'
Another situation in which the state courts have experienced dif-
ficulty in finding a procedure arises out of multiple offender statutes.
Under these a defendant's sentence is often determined with reference
156 Bland, Caminito, Leyra, Todd, Wade. In addition to these, Gonzales may have
raised his contention of a coerced confession at the original trial, but there was no
appeal. Mention should also be made of Almeida and Carmen in which the federal
question arose initially in the prosecution stage, although it was effectively presented
only in a subsequent collateral attack proceeding. See notes 165, 174 infra.
157 DeVita, Grandsinger, Lunce, Mills.
158 Berry, Bowers, Carmen, Garton, Houston, Montgomery (Mo.), Savini, Todd.
'59 Lack of counsel was the constitutional basis of attack for nine of the 11
cases in this category. The two cases in which this was not true were Carmen and
Goldsby. See note 119 supra.
160 Todd v. State, 226 Ind. at 502, 81 N.E.2d at 532; dissenting opinions are
found at 81 N.E.2d at 784, and 82 N.E.2d at 407.
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to a prior conviction in another state. Should the defendant challenge
that prior conviction at this point, an awkward problem is posed. Two
of the 11 cases arose in this way,"6 and the sentencing courts in New
York declined to review the validity of the prior convictions by sister
states. 1 2  At the same time, the courts of the states of the prior judg-
ments refused to hear petitions for writs of error coram nobis. 63
Habeas corpus was not available in those states since the petitioners
were not in custody there under the challenged sentence.
An unusual situation arose in the Carmen case-the only case
among the 35 which turns on a federal statute rather than on the
Constitution.' The distinction was crucial to the litigation in the
California Supreme Court, where it was held that the state habeas
corpus remedy was not sufficiently broad to encompass a contention
not constitutional in origin requiring determination of factual issues
outside the record. The particular question was whether Congress had
pre-empted jurisdiction over the offense for which petitioner had been
tried; even though the California court realized that state jurisdiction
had been ousted, and though a death sentence was involved, the court
could not find a state remedy.1
6 5
Three of the 11 cases in which the states' highest courts based
their decision on a rule of state law were not instances of a lack of any
state procedure for litigation of the federal claim.' 6 They were, rather,
instances of abortion of the state procedures which, so far as the state
courts were concerned, forfeited any right to state consideration of the
merits.
Goldsby, a Negro, was tried for murder in Mississippi. His
white lawyers, one court-appointed, chose not to challenge the grand
or petit juries on racial discrimination grounds.6 7 That issue was
161 Bowers, Savini.
162 In Savini there was apparently no attempt to present the issue to any New
York court, but the Second Circuit indicated that New York would not entertain
such an assertion. 205 F.2d at 351.
16 3 In Savini, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner might
receive a hearing on a coram nobis application when he found it possible to appear
before a Michigan court. This decision is not reported but is mentioned in the
Second Circuit opinion, note 162 supra, at 351.
164 See notes 126, 127 sipra and accompanying text.
165 On direct appeal from the conviction, the California Supreme Court reversed
on the ground of federal pre-emption. People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 265 P.2d
900 (1954). On rehearing, the court held that the record was inadequate for such a
conclusion and the conviction was affirmed. 43 Cal. 2d 342, 273 P.2d 521 (1954).
Thereupon, a habeas corpus proceeding was initiated in the California Supreme
Court, and the case was referred to a master who found that the case did in fact
come within the exclusive federal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the state court denied
relief. 48 Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957). Certiorari was denied without prejudice
to an application for federal habeas corpus. 355 U.S. 924 (1958).
166 Bland, Goldsby, Johns.
'6 7 An attorney from Chicago, who had prepared to challenge the grand and
petit juries on this ground, withdrew from the case and turned the papers he had
drawn for this purpose over to Goldsby's trial attorneys.
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first presented to the state courts in a post-trial application in the state
supreme court for habeas corpus and coram nobis. The Mississippi
court, relying on a state requirement that challenges to juries must be
presented in the preliminary stages of trial, held that the question had
come too late. In Johns, the petitioner sought coram nobis and
obtained a hearing in an Indiana state trial court. From a denial of
relief, an appeal was taken to the state supreme court, but when the
petitioner's attorney filed the transcript of the lower court proceedings
eleven days late the appeal was dismissed, the majority of the court
viewing the time requirement as jurisdictional. In the Bland case,
after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed his conviction,
and while a petition for rehearing was pending, the prisoner escaped
and remained at large for three weeks. Thereafter, the court set aside
its affirmance and dismissed the appeal on the ground of the escape."" 8
The problem posed by these cases is one of the most vexing
questions found in federal habeas corpus law today. A state prisoner,
in the process of litigating a federal claim, has forfeited his opportunity
for final state court determination of that claim. Has he also forfeited
his federal right? More precisely, what effect should the state
forfeiture have in the United States Supreme Court on certiorari from
the state judgment? 169 Or in a subsequent federal habeas corpus
proceeding? The answer to the latter question can be found only after
the recent Supreme Court decision in Irvin v. Dowd 170 is analyzed and
reconciled with the Court's earlier decision in Daniels v. Allen."' This
168 Bland also raised the same federal question in an application for habeas
corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This application was denied by-
the court on the ground that the petitioner had had his day in court.
169 The question would focus in terms of the established rule that the Supreme
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision of a state court which rests upon an
independent and adequate nonfederal ground. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S.
207 (1935); HART & WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE: FEDERAL SYSTEM
421-443 (1953); ROBERTSON & KRXHAM, JURIsDicTioN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNTED STATES §§ 89-103 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951).
170 359 U.S. 394 (1959). The facts of the Irvin case are very similar to those
in the Bland case. Irvin's escape from custody came while a motion for new trial
was pending before the state trial court following conviction. On grounds of his
absconding, the motion was denied. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on the
basis of the escape rule but went on to say that, even though it was unnecessary for
the decision, the court had examined the constitutional issues raised by Irvin and
found them without merit. Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898 (1957).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari without prejudice to an application for federal
habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies. 353 U.S. 948 (1957). The federal
district court and the court of appeals denied relief because the state proceedings
had aborted. Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ind. 1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 548
(7th Cir. 1958). The Supreme Court held that Irvin was entitled to a federal
habeas corpus hearing on the merits of his claims and remanded the case.
171Daniels was decided sub non. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The
issue in Daniels arose when the attorney for the defendant was one day late in filing
the appeal from the conviction in the North Carolina Supreme Court. That court
accordingly declined to entertain the appeal. The Supreme Court held that this
failure to use a state channel, which was adequate and easily availed of, foreclosed
federal habeas corpus relief.
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is a major undertaking, since the rationale of neither case is clear, and
lies beyond the scope of this Article." 2 Suffice it to say here that none
of the efforts to build a rational principle or system for this aspect of
federal-state relations has been satisfactory.'
Unfathomable State Court Decisions
Not a great deal can be said about those six cases in which the
state courts' decisions are shrouded in silence. In the absence of a
written opinion, it is impossible to know with certainty what was
decided or why. It is quite conceivable, and indeed likely, that some
or all of them were disposed of on a nonfederal ground.
All were original or extraordinary applications for relief in the
highest state court. 74 Although each of the prisoners was facing a
death sentence, in not one of the cases did the court make or authorize
a factual inquiry into the contentions advanced. The decisions ap-
parently rested entirely upon the papers filed and the arguments, if
any, of counsel. Yet the constitutional questions in these cases could
172 The analysis would necessarily extend to three major sets of doctrine. First
is the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies as a condition precedent to federal
habeas corpus proceedings; where the state litigation has been aborted through a
failure to comply with state procedures it may be questioned whether the exhaustion
requirement has been met. Second, there are the well-established rules on waiver
of constitutional rights which could operate in this context to extinguish the rights
asserted in the state proceedings. See, e.g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948).
The third doctrinal complex to be considered is centered in the rule that the Supreme
Court lacks jurisdiction to review a state judgment which rests upon an independent
and adequate nonfederal ground; the same principles could be applied, perhaps, to
determine the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. This latter was the
position of the dissenters in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 407, 412 (1959). The
majority decided the case in terms of the exhaustion requirement. Full treatment
of the problem would entail not only analysis of each of these three areas inde-
pendently, but also their interrelationship.
'73 Apart from the opinions in the Supreme Court and the lower federal court
decisions, the principal effort in this area is the recent article by Professor Henry
Hart in which he advances the thesis that the independent-and-adequate-nonfederal-
ground rule should be incorporated as a standard for determining the scope of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Hart, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1958
Temn, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959). This follows the position taken by the four
dissenting Justices in the Irvin case. 359 U.S. at 412, 416-17.
1
7 4 Ahneida, Ellisor, and Thompson were applications for habeas corpus filed in
the state supreme court. In an earlier motion for new trial, Almeida had sug-
gested the possibility that evidence had been suppressed, but the allegation of wilful
suppression was not made until the habeas corpus application. Prior to the appli-
cation in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Ellisor sought habeas corpus in
a Texas trial court without avail. In Sheffield's case, the federal issues were pre-
sented to the Louisiana Supreme Court in an extraordinary petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition. The petition was summarily denied. Mills took a delayed
appeal on the common-law record to the Illinois Supreme Court some eleven years
after conviction. That court affirmed without opinion. Thereafter, an application
for habeas corpus in a county court was also denied. Grandsinger's constitutional claims
were presented to the Nebraska Supreme Court in an amended and supplemental
petition for rehearing of the judgment affirming conviction. The state court granted
a motion for leave to file the petition and summarily denied the petition without
opinion.
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not be fairly decided in so summary a fashion. Two involved serious
allegations of wilful prosecution suppression of evidence favorable to
the accused." 5 The others presented difficult questions of right to
counsel.176  The cavalier disposition without explanation lends support
to the view that the courts did not decide the merits of the claims, but
rather found they were not properly presented for decision.
This was the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in the Al[meida case.17 7  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had rejected summarily a petition for habeas corpus alleging
wilful suppression of evidence by the prosecution. Chief Judge Biggs
spoke for the court of appeals:
"We cannot determine with absolute certainty the reason for the
refusal of the writ. Our difficulty in determining why the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania refused the writ is enhanced because the
Court took no testimony and made no findings. . . . We can-
not assume that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was ignorant
of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States . .. 1 7
The Third Circuit found a "comparatively simple" explanation in the
Pennsylvania rule that the consideration of an application for habeas
corpus, under the original jurisdiction of the state supreme court, is
discretionary with that court. "It follows therefore, and we think the
conclusion is almost irresistible, that the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania denied the writ in the exercise of its discretion and did not pass
upon the merits of Almeida's application." 179
Federal Claims Never Presented to the Highest
State Appellate Courts
The category of cases in which the federal claim never reached
the highest appellate court of a state is actually made up of several
distinct and separate branches. In one of these eight, an application
175 Almeida, Thompson.
176 The Sheffield case actually involved a multitude of constitutional errors which
together revealed that the trial was virtually a sham. The counsel issue (a battery
of five lawyers had been appointed to represent the defendant with no time to
prepare a defense) was probably the outstanding factor in indicating the lack of a
fair trial. In addition to the counsel issue, Mills also alleged a coerced guilty plea.
177 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952). The legal relevance of this fact to the case
before the court is not at all clear.
178 Id. at 822.
1
79 Id. at 823. The Third Circuit met the argument that Almeida still had a
state remedy which he had not exhausted, namely an application for habeas corpus
to a county court in Pennsylvania, by finding that "no lower Pennsylvania Court
could be reasonably expected, in view of the action of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania . . . , to grant the writ to Almeida." Id. at 824. Compare Medberry v.
Patterson, 174 F. Supp. 720 (D. Colo. 1959), holding that there had not been exhaus-
tion of state remedies in a similar situation.
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for state habeas corpus decided by a trial level court,80 the state
followed the common-law rule, still vital in many jurisdictions, which
did not permit appeal of a decision in habeas corpus.'"' Even where
appellate jurisdiction had been conferred within the hierarchy of state
courts, in four cases the prisoner was unable to take advantage of an
appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding and the final judgment was that
of a lower tribunal. 2 In three of these, the obstacle was financial:
docketing fees,'8 3 appeal bonds, 8" or the cost of a printed record and
briefs.' 85 The state courts, regarding the proceedings as civil, found
no in forma pauperis procedure for indigents whereby these monetary
prerequisites could be waived.
The federal claim in another of the eight cases was never presented
to any state court, high or low.'8 ' The exact dimensions of the con-
stitutional problem, involving the use of the confession of an accomplice
against the petitioner, are hardly clear in the federal court's opinion; .8.
but the district judge excused petitioner's failure to secure a state
determination on the ground that there was no remedy available.
The Gonzales case also involves a confession ultimately found to
have been coerced. At the original trial, the issue of coercion 188 was
submitted to the jury simultaneously with the issue of guilt or innocence,
and the jury's actual determination on coercion was concealed in the
general verdict of guilty. An appeal from this conviction was never
perfected.8 9 This terminated the only state court litigation of the
dispositive constitutional question.190
180 Montgomery (Ill.). This case arose prior to the adoption of the Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act. That statute did not supersede the habeas corpus
remedy, and the same pattern of a final state habeas corpus adjudication in a trial
court can still occur. See, e.g., Westbrook
181 CHuRf, THE WaiT oF HABEAS CORPUS §§ 389b-e (2d ed. 1893).
182 Green, Mullreed, Rhea, Woods.
18 3 Woods.
184 Rhea
185 Green was denied relief by a single judge of the Maine Supreme judicial
Court, but the lack of an in forma pauperis procedure to waive the costs of printed
briefs and record precluded an appeal to the court en banc. A federal district court
held recently that failure to seek certiorari to the lower state court, when appeal
is precluded by a financial barrier, is a violation of the rule of Darr v. Burford.
United States exr rel. Carrono v. Richmond, 177 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1959).
186 White.
187 See note 120 supra.
188 It is not clear whether the objection to the confession was put in consti-
tutional terms or simply as a matter of admissibility under common-law rules of
evidence.
189 This may have been an instance of court-appointed counsel withdrawing from
the case at the conclusion of the trial court proceeding. In any event, the federal
courts did not discuss the failure to appeal under the requirement of exhaustion of
state remedies.
190A subsequent petition for habeas corpus in the Washington Supreme Court
did not raise the issue of a coerced confession. Both the district court and the court
of appeals in the federal habeas corpus proceeding cited the state habeas corpus
phase as indicating that state remedies had been exhausted.
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Finally there is one case in which it is fairly clear that the federal
claim, as such, was never raised in the state courts.'91 The dispositive
issue concerned a free transcript of the proceedings in a state habeas
corpus hearing. 92 The prisoner was doggedly pursuing other con-
stitutional claims 193 and merely sought the transcript in order to take
an appeal. The Ninth Circuit, subsequently granting relief, alluded
to the absence of clear presentation of the controlling issue to the state
courts (as well as to the federal district court)"" but stated simply
that a prisoner need not "cite to the state court book and verse on the
federal constitution." ' The court added that the long delay in the
prisoner's fight for relief, unaided along the way by counsel, justified
the court of appeals in ordering immediate remedy without further
proceedings.
State Court Decisions on the Merits of the Federal Claims
There were ten cases among the 35 studied in which the highest
state courts decided, or apparently decided, the federal issues on their
merits.196 Even in this category, however, the quality of the state
court handling of the cases was largely inadequate. Three prisoners
struggled through several successive stages of their respective states'
collateral attack procedures without the assistance of counsel. 97 One
of them in addition had to face the paradox that his constitutional
contention concerned denial of counsel at his original trial. This put
him in the position of attempting to prove by his own wits that he lacked
the wit to stand trial initially. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
found his performance in the habeas corpus proceeding so good that it
satisfied them he did not need counsel during the trial of his guilt or
innocence. 98
Five other cases received full processing in the state courts with
one major omission: the highest state courts wrote no opinions at all
191 Daugharty.
192 The constitutional claims were similar to those in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
193 His principle contention was that the forgery statute, under which he had
been convicted, was repealed when Oregon joined the Union.
194 257 F.2d at 758.
195 Ibid.
198 In some cases, where the state courts published no opinions, it is not known
what the exact grounds for decision were. Since the issues were presented to the
courts and there is no reason to believe that their decisions rested on matters of
state law or procedure, it is fair to conclude that the federal questions were decided.
See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945). This group has been classified
separately from the other cases in which the state courts wrote no opinions on the
basis of the presence in those others of a possible state basis for the decision. See
the discussion of Ahneida in text at notes 177-79 supra.
197 Collins, Massey, Westbrook.
198EX parte Massey, 157 Tex. Crim. 491, 249 S.W.2d 599 (1952).
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or wrote opinions which failed to treat the federal question.1 99 Since
that issue was presented to the court in each case, it is fairly safe to
assume that it was decided on the merits. Two were New York
murder cases, arising at approximately the same time in the early
1940's, both involving confessions later found to have been coerced. 00
At the trial, the factual issue of coercion was submitted to the jury
encompassed within the larger question of guilt or innocence. In both,
the appellate division and the court of appeals affirmed convictions in
brief memorandum opinions. 01 Also among these five is the famous
Leyra case, another New York murder prosecution in which a coerced
confession was used. On appeal from conviction the court of appeals
wrote two opinions, but neither the majority nor the dissent discussed
the issue of coercion in federal constitutional terms.20 2  That the issue
was raised in that dimension is assured by the summary of arguments
of counsel published in the New York reports. 3
Another of the five cases in which the state court's opinions did
not openly consider the role of the federal constitution and the United
,tates Reports is the DeVita case in New Jersey. The constitutional
claim, raised in a delayed motion for new trial,204 was based upon the
fact that one of the jurors had failed to reveal that he had been the
victim of a robbery similar to the one underlying the murder prosecution
of DeVita. The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the problem
within the framework of state law and procedure, although the opinion
of the court states that the motion for new trial asserted a denial of due
process of law.20 5 In explanation of the state court's action, it should
199 Caminito, DeVita, Leyra, Stoner, Wade. See also Westbrook The Illinois
Circuit Court entered an order denying Stoner's writ of error in a postconviction pro-
ceeding on the ground that he had failed to establish that his constitutional rights
had been violated. This conclusion was not amplified or supported.
200 Caminito, Wade.
201Although not revealed in opinions of the state courts, the Second Circuit
indicated that the federal question was properly raised at the original prosecution and
appeal in both of these cases. Caminito, 222 F.2d at 699; Wade, 256 F._d at 8-9.
In subsequent state proceedings, Caminito sought twice without success to have
reargument of his appeal in the New York Court of Appeals. Wade made one
futile attempt to secure reargument; he also instituted a coram nobis proceeding
which did not raise the confession question. For a discussion of the latter phases of
the Wade case by the counsel who represented the prisoner, see Roemer, Court
Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Appellant, 3 Colum. L. Alumni Bull., Oct. 1958,
p. 1.
202304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E2d 673 (1952).
203 304 N.Y. at 469.
204 The ultimately dispositive federal question was not presented either on appeal
from the conviction or in a prior state habeas corpus proceeding, but it appears that
the facts were not known to the prisoners or their counsel at those stages.
205 State v. Grillo, 16 N.J. 103, 106, 106 A.2d 294, 295 (1954). The court did
cite one Supreme Court decision, but this was in dictum on whether the contention
had been waived because not diligently raised.
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be noted that the later finding by the federal courts of a constitutional
violation marked a distinct advance in the law of due process.
200
Finally, there were two cases in which the treatment accorded by
the states was plenary. In Lunce, the issue was lack of counsel. The
facts showed that an Indiana defendant had been represented at his
trial by a lawyer, apparently of his own choosing, who was a member
of the Ohio bar only. The case was very poorly tried. When the
initial steps toward appeal were also mishandled, the Indiana Supreme
Court asked the Public Defender to take the case and, at this stage, the
Defender made the charge of lack of effective counsel. The Indiana
court held that the errors of counsel did not rise to a violation of
constitutional guarantees. 207  The federal courts disagreed.
In Curran, the issue was perjury by a police officer without the
knowledge of the prosecutor. The Delaware court held that "the
federal rule appears to be that perjury by a witness is not a denial of
due process unless brought home to the prosecuting officer." 208 There-
after, the federal courts, relying on a little known interpretation of
Pyle v. Kansas,200 ruled that perjury by a state official afforded in
itself sufficient basis for upsetting the conviction.
These 35 cases demonstrate the urgent necessity for the present
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. The significance of the constitutional
rights involved goes beyond a simple technical requirement of com-
pliance with procedural rules. The purpose of the guarantees of due
process and equal protection in the ultimate is to prevent conviction of
the innocent. In two cases, that fundamental truth is brought home
in the most dramatic fashion. Both Leyra and Grandsinger were
sentenced to death for state crimes. The New York Court of Appeals
brushed Leyra's claim of a coerced confession aside without expressing
any views on its merit.210 The Nebraska Supreme Court summarily
dismissed Grandsinger's serious contention of lack of effective assistance
of counsel. 1 After these convictions had been set aside in federal
20
6 The conclusion that nondisclosure of a past experience by a juror on voir dire
examination constitutes state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment is certainly not a self-evident proposition. This issue is not discussed in the
federal court opinions.
207 It should be noted that several years prior to this case the Indiana Supreme
Court had held that a conviction must be reversed under the federal and state con-
stitutions where counsel for the defendant had mishandled the case. Wilson v. State,
222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943). In the Lunce case, the Indiana court found that
Wilson was distinguishable.
208 49 Del. at 595, 122 A.2d at 130.
209 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
210 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E2d 673 (1952).
211 The order of the state court is unreported. Certiorari was denied in
Grandsinger v. Nebraska, 352 U.S. 880 (1956).
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habeas corpus, both were retried. Leyra was prosecuted without the
coerced confession and the New York Court of Appeals held that there
was insufficient evidence to support a conviction and ordered the
indictment dismissed.21 Grandsinger was retried with new counsel
and found not guilty.21 3 But for federal habeas corpus, these two men
would have gone to their deaths for crimes of which they were found
not guilty.
Petitions for Certiorari to the State Courts
As each of the 35 cases surveyed presented a question of federal
law, 214 each came within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review
state judgments and might have been reversed by the Court on certiorari
to the state court.215  Indeed, the rule of Darr v. Burford,216 requiring
that ordinarily a state prisoner seek certiorari as a prerequisite to
initiating a federal habeas corpus proceeding, should have operated to
actualize this possibility. But the previous discussion of developments
within the state court systems makes it eminently clear that in virtually
212 People v. Leyra, 1 N.Y.2d 199, 134 N.E.2d 475, 151 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1956).
213 Lincoln Star (Neb.), Nov. 27, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
214 Perhaps a de facto exception must be made for the White case. See note 120
supra.
215 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958), final judgments of state courts in cases
which present a federal question may be reviewed by appeal (as of right) or by
writ of certiorari (in the discretion of the Court). The right of appeal is narrowly
limited to two classes of cases. Under § 1257(1), an appeal lies if a state court
holds a federal statute or treaty invalid. In the only one of the 35 cases involving a
federal statute, Carmen, the state court decided the case on questions of state pro-
cedure. Under § 1257(2), an appeal lies if a state court upholds a state statute
against a challenge that it is repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States. Virtually none of the cases considered concerned attacks upon state
statutes, although there were two cases, Collins and Rhea, which raised the issue
of lack of notice to the defendant that an habitual offender statute would be invoked
in fixing sentence. While this question might have been framed so as to permit an
appeal, Collins sought certiorari and Rhea never attempted to get Supreme Court
review.
216 339 U.S. 200 (1950). The sanction applied in Darr v. Burford for failure to
seek certiorari after the state judgment was foreclosure of the federal habeas corpus
remedy. If the state court should entertain the claim on the merits again and an
application for certiorari were made and denied, then federal habeas corpus would
then be available. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
Even where the state court refused on res judicata grounds to decide the merits
again, an application for certiorari has been held to reopen federal habeas corpus
procedures. United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953).
But the Supreme Court has said that where a state judgment rests upon an adequate
state ground, and res judicata is probably such, it is unnecessary to petition for
certiorari. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
There is plainly a need to rethink the problem posed by failure to seek cer-
tiorari from a state judgment-if such a requirement is to be retained-particularly
with respect to the penalty attached. One seeks in vain in Darr v. Burford for any
realization on the part of either the Court or the dissent that the decision probably
meant a total forfeiture of the constitutional rights of the state prisoner; and again
in Collins for any understanding that the certiorari petition was a useless gesture.
See also the admittedly "harsh" ruling in United States ex rel. Carrono v. Richmond,
177 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1959).
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none of these 35 cases could the power of the Supreme Court have
been employed.
Plainly enough, where the federal question had never been presented
to the state courts, there was no state judgment to be brought to the
United States Supreme Court. Likewise, where the state litigation
terminated below the highest court of the state system, the Supreme
Court may not have been in a favorable position to grant review.217
Even where the states' highest courts passed upon the cases, the bases
for their decisions or the generally. poor quality of the procedures fol-
lowed effectively precluded, in almost every instance, review of the judg-
ment by the Supreme Court of the United States.
When the state court rested its judgment on the unassailability of
the common-law record or the narrow scope of the state's habeas corpus
jurisdiction, that court was holding, in short, that there was no state
remedy available for the type of federal claim asserted. Unless the
Supreme Court were to say that the Constitution requires a state to
create a remedy where none has heretofore existed, the judgment of
the state court stands on an adequate and independent nonfederal
ground. On well established principles of Supreme Court jurisdiction,
such a judgment will not be reviewed. 18
There is a practical, if not jurisdictional, bar to Supreme Court
review where the proceedings in the state courts have been pro-
cedurally inadequate, and particularly where the lack of a written
opinion in the state court leaves in doubt whether the basis for the
decision is a matter of federal or state law.219 Even where there is fair
assurance that the federal question was decided, there is little point for
Supreme Court consideration if the basic record is incompletely or
inexpertly compiled. And where the state judges have not prepared
reasoned opinions on the issues, the Supreme Court lacks the con-
sidered guidance which might have been provided through lower court
analysis of the dimensions and depth of the problem.
A thorough study of the petitions for certiorari and related papers
which were in fact submitted to the Supreme Court in those of the 35
cases in which review was sought reinforces the conclusion that the
Court probably could not have taken more than one or two of them. In
217 Particularly lacking in many such instances is the critical and informed
analysis of a problem which comes from one or two stages of appellate review of
a case by state courts. There may be the additional problem of unresolved doubt
on a matter of state law which has not been passed on by the state supreme court
218 See note 169 supra.
219 The Supreme Court has held that it lacks jurisdiction to review a state
judgment if the question of a state ground to support the judgment is even debatable.
Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956) ; Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952) ;
Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (1907); cf. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
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13 cases the Court had no opportunity even to consider the matter, for
no petition for certiorari raising the dispositive federal question was
filed.220 Included among the 13 are five of the eight cases in which the
ultimately dispositive federal question was never presented to the
highest state court either. 21 The remainder are comprised of four in
which the states' highest courts invoked a rule of state law as a basis
for their judgments,222 two in which the basis of the state judgment
was unfathomable,223 and two in which the state courts decided the
federal issue adversely to the prisoners.2
Petitions for certiorari raising the dispositive federal question were
filed in 22 of the 35 cases.225  All were denied. In several instances,
however, the denial was supplemented or explained. The Court ex-
pressly noted in one order that the petition for certiorari had been filed
out of time.226 On another occasion, Justices Black and Douglas noted
a dissent.2 Two others were set apart by the increasingly seen
qualification that the denial was without prejudice to an application for
habeas corpus in an appropriate federal district court.2 One of these
was the case in which the California Supreme Court, after considerable
struggle, was unable to find a state remedy.22 The other arose in
Louisiana, the order below having denied without written opinion an
original application for an extraordinary writ.230
2 2 0 Daugharty, DeVita, Ellisor, Gonzales, Green, Johns, Massey, Montgomery
(Mo.), Rhea, Savini, Thompson, Todd, White. In five of these cases, there was a
petition for certiorari, but at some stage of the case prior to the raising of the dis-
positive federal question. Daugharty, DeVita, Gonzales, Massey, Thompson. The
first certiorari petition filed by Westbrook comes within this class.
2 2 1 Daugharty, Gonzales, Green, Rhea, White.
2 22 Johns, Montgomery (Mo.), Savini, Todd.
2 2 3 Ellisor, Thompson.
22 4 DeVita, Massey. These two cases raise difficult questions in light of the rule
of Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), that a certiorari application must be filed
from the state judgment. All of the other petitioners might have invoked the excuse
that the state judgment had not rested upon the merits of the federal claim. White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). In Massey, the federal courts never considered the
problem. In DeVita, where death sentences were involved, the Third Circuit held
that the lack of a petition for certiorari was excused because the district court had
granted a stay of execution after three Supreme Court Justices had denied requests for
a stay. 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954). The court of appeals overlooked the possibility
that the petition for certiorari could have been filed while the sty issued by the district
court was in effect, even though they cited a case in which exactly that procedure
had been followed. Thomas v. Teets, 205 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1953).
2 25 Almeida, Berry, Bland, Bowers, Caminito, Carmen, Collins, Curran, Garton,
Goldsby, Grandsinger, Houston, Leyra, Lunce, Mills, Montgomery (IlL), Mullreed,
Sheffield, Stoner, Wade, Westbrook, Woods. There were two petitions for cer-
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The quality of the petitions in these 22 cases was substantially
better than the general run of cases on the Miscellaneous Docket of the
Supreme Court.231 There were nine cases, for example, in which the
petitions were prepared by lawyers.232 In each, a record was filed with
the petition.2 3  And, in six of the nine cases, the state filed a response
by way of opposition; 234 such responses by states are rare on the
Miscellaneous Docket.
Although we have it on good authority that speculation on the
reasons for denial of certiorari is not likely to be profitable, the rationale
of Darr v. Burford perhaps justifies closer examination of that group
of cases in which the state courts decided the federal question on its
merits.235  These were the most likely grist for Supreme Court review.
Yet, despite the Court's clear assumption in Darr v. Burford of a
special obligation to consider this kind of judgment of state courts,
certiorari was not granted in any of them.
It will be recalled that there were ten cases in this category. As
stated earlier, in two of them the Supreme Court had no opportunity
to review the state judgment since no petition for certiorari raising
the dispositive federal question was filed.236  In two more cases,
Supreme Court review was impossible at the time when the certiorari
application was filed, the prisoner having sought certiorari not from
the state court's judgment on the merits, but rather after a later state
proceeding in which the state court rested its judgment on principles
of state law.23 Thus, as concerned the judgment which was the subject
231 See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
232 Almeida (both petitions), Carmen, Curran, Garton, Goldsby, Grandsinger,
Leyra, Lunce, Sheffield. Almeida is officially reported as moving pro se, because
his attorneys were not members of the bar of the Supreme Court. In two other
cases, the high quality of the petition and the capacity of the prisoner are so incon-
sistent that one must conclude that the petitions were actually drafted by a skilled
attorney: Collins and Montgomery (Ill.).
233 There were records filed in six other cases as well. Berry, Bland (first
petition), Mills (partial), Montgomery (Ill.), Mullreed, Wade (first petition).234 Almeida (first petition), Curran, Garton, Goldsby, Grandsinger, Leyra. Re-
sponses were also filed in two other cases: Wade (first petition), and Westbrook
(second petition).
235The emphasis in this discussion is on the feasibility of Supreme Court review
of state judgments, on the assumption that the Court is consciously following the
policy of wide review of those judgments.2 36 See note 224 supra and accompanying text.
237 Calinito, Collins.
2381n Caminito, the only petition for certiorari was filed after the New York
Court of Appeals had denied without opinion a second motion for reargument This
motion, coming some eleven years after the original judgment of affirmance, was
clearly addressed to the discretion of the state court. Collins had the misfortune to
be impaled on the rule of Darr v. Burford. He had sought state habeas corpus
and gone through several stages of federal habeas corpus litigation when that case
was announced. The lower federal courts promptly terminated Collins' federal
habeas corpus case because he had never applied for certiorari from the state habeas
corpus judgment. Thereupon Collins started a new state habeas corpus case, was
denied on grounds of res judicata, and then applied for certiorari.
[Vo1.108:461
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of the certiorari petition, there probably was an independent and ade-
quate nonfederal ground.
239
Of the remaining six cases, in four there were no opinions of the
state courts dealing with the federal question.240 Such lower court
opinions are important to the work of the Supreme Court, as they not
only tend to bring out and focus the precise issues, but assist the
Supreme Court in analyzing the problems presented. Take, for
example, the Leyra case. Within a span of one year, the case was
twice presented to the Supreme Court for review: first on application
for review of the New York Court of Appeals' affirmance of Leyra's
conviction; then on application for review from the lower federal courts'
denial of habeas corpus. All the factual evidence was part of the original
trial transcript and was before the Court on both applications. The
one difference in the record was that, whereas the New York courts
had provided no written opinions on the constitutional issue,241 the
lower federal courts published three opinions, including the sharply
clashing views of Judges Clark and Frank in the Second Circuit.
24 2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the habeas corpus case and
ultimately ordered the New York conviction set aside.243
In the final two cases, the possibility of Supreme Court review
was not reduced by the quality of the proceedings in the state courts.
The Delaware courts in the Curran case and the Indiana courts in the
Lunce case had given plenary consideration to the asserted federal
questions. The reason, or reasons, why these cases did not win the
votes of four of the Justices to grant certiorari cannot, of course, be
known.
These 35 cases, in the Supreme Court, reveal the lack of merit
in the proposition that federal constitutional rights of state prisoners
can be protected adequately by Supreme Court review of the judgments
of state courts, the proposition put forward by those who favor abolition
or sharp delimitation of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction." 4 The
fact of the matter is that, with very minor exception, the Supreme Court
was powerless to review the state judgments. Nevertheless, the state
prisoners obtained relief in a subsequent federal habeas corpus
proceeding.
239 See note 169 supra.
24OLeyra, Stoner, Wade, Westbrook.
241 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673 (1952).
242 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953).
243 347 U.S. 556 (1954). For a recent case holding that the absence of findings
of fact and opinions in the state courts necessitates independent scrutiny in federal
habeas corpus see United States ex rel. Sileo v. Martin, 269 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1959).
244 See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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The Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding
Little need be said here about the federal habeas corpus stage of
the cases studied. But it is significant to note the sharply rising fre-
quency of these successful petitions for federal habeas corpus relief.
The 35 cases spread across a twelve-year span, with 80 per cent of the
cases in the second six years and 40 per cent in the last two complete
years.245 Whether this trend will continue in the future is a matter of
conjecture, of course, but the developments do indicate that federal
habeas corpus practice will play an ever increasing role in the application
of the Constitution within the administration of state criminal law.
The bulk of these cases-27-were decided in favor of the state
prisoner in the district courts. In seven instances, the petitioner won
his case on the merits in a court of appeals after having been denied
relief by a district court.246  There was only one case in which a
prisoner lost in both of the lower federal courts but prevailed in the
Supreme Court of the United States.
2 '4 7
It was somewhat surprising to find a relative absence of appeals
by the states from district court judgments in favor of state prisoners. A8
There was no such appeal in 14 of the 27 cases,249 including eight of
the 11 in which the state courts had decided the cases on a nonfederal
ground.250 Similarly, of 19 court of appeals judgments in favor of a
state prisoner,251 the states petitioned for certiorari in the Supreme
Court in only nine.252 The Supreme Court refused to grant review of
any of them, even though some of the decisions below broke new and
2 4 5 The date selected for this purpose was the date of the court of appeals judg-
ment or Supreme Court decision in those cases in which the state prisoner first pre-
vailed at an appellate stage. Otherwise the date is that of the district court decision.
The pattern by year is as follows: 1959-2; 1958-8; 1957--6; 1956-2; 1955-5;
1954-5; 1953-3; 1952-0; 1951-1; 1950-0; 1949-2; 1948--.
2 46 Caminito, Collins, Daugharty, DeVita, Goldsby, Thompson, Wade.
24 7 Leyra.
248 In light of the strong feeling among state officials that a federal district court
should not "reverse" the judgments of state courts, it is difficult to understand why
no effort was made to obtain a decision from a higher federal court See text accom-
panying note 314 infra.
249 Berry, Bland, Carmen, Garton, Houston, Johns, Massey, Montgomery (Ill.),
Montgomery (Mo.), Mills, Muilreed, Stoner, Todd, White. In addition to these,
Louisiana tried to appeal in the Sheffield case and was denied a certificate of probable
cause. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1958). The state thereupon sought common-law
certiorari in the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1958), without success.
250 Berry, Bland, Carmen, Garton, Houston, Johns, Montgomery (Mo.), Todd.
251 These include the seven cases decided in favor of the state prisoner for the first
time in the court of appeals and 12 affirmances of district court decisions. The figure
19 does not include the Sheffield case in which the court of appeals refused to give
the state a certificate of probable cause to appeal. See note 249 supra.
2 52 Almeida, Caminito, Curran, DeVita, Goldsby, Gonzales, Grandsinger, Thomp-
son, Wade. This does not include the Louisiana convnon-law certiorari petition in
the Sheffield case. See note 249 supra.
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important ground in the matter of constitutional law 253 or evolved
novel and questionable theories of what constitutes exhaustion of state
remedies. 254
This "hands off" policy 255 with respect to federal habeas corpus
litigation is not entirely consistent with the principle, adopted in Darr
v. Burford, that the Supreme Court has a special responsibility to
review state criminal judgments. The Court was there speaking in
the context of certiorari to the state courts, but the principle would
appear to have as much, if not more, applicability in the federal habeas
corpus stage. Where the lower federal courts have granted relief to a
state prisoner, they have singled out a case as worthy of Supreme Court
consideration. Congress might amend the chapter of the Judicial
Code to permit appeal to the Supreme Court as of right, rather than
the current pattern of review by certiorari, in such instances. The
same effect could be achieved without legislative action if the Supreme
Court modified its practice to afford more frequent review of federal
habeas corpus cases on petition for certiorari by a state. Either of
these changes would remove much of the onus now falling on the
lower federal courts for upsetting state judgments. An entirely dif-
ferent perspective would be given to the attacks which have been made
on the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction by associating it solely with
the lower federal courts.
V. DENIAL OF CERTIORARI "WITHOUT PREJUDICE .
One of the most puzzling aspects in the relationships between state
and federal courts in state criminal cases regards an unusual practice
which is being followed by the Supreme Court. With ever increasing
regularity, the Court's order list has contained denials of certiorari
qualified by the phrase, "without prejudice to an application for habeas
corpus in an appropriate United States District Court." 258 Two such
orders appear in the histories of the 35 cases discussed above.
257
A survey of the United States Reports has brought to light a total
of 19 of these curious orders since 1950, of which eight were in the
1958 Term.2 58 This qualified denial is invariably used in cases coming
253 E.g, Curran, DeVita, Grandsinger.
254 E.g., DeVita, Goldsby.
255 The Supreme Court has not denied every application for certiorari filed by
a state. See, e.g., Dowd v. United States ez rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Dye v.
Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
256 The order has not always appeared in these exact words.
257 Carmen, Sheffield.
258 Burke v. Georgia, 338 U.S. 941 (1950); Chessman v. California, 348 U.S.
864 (1954); Sheffield v. Louisiana, 348 U.S. 850 (1954) ; Scalf v. Skeen, 348 U.S. 903
(1954); Landeros v. New Jersey, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); Reck v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
1960]
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from a state court25 9 and is a visible manifestation of the pivotal posi-
tion of the Supreme Court in such litigation. A better understanding
of the Court's role can be obtained though analysis of the meaning and
purpose of these odd denials of certiorari.
The form of the order is, to say the least, perplexing. To say that
a denial of certiorari is without prejudice seems to infer that a denial
not so qualified is or might be with prejudice. Yet the Supreme Court
has consistently maintained that a denial of certiorari cannot be in-
terpreted to have any meaning on the merits of the questions pre-
sented. 160 With particular reference to federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings, the issue was closed beyond all doubt in Brown v. Allen.
26 1
Professor Henry Hart recently questioned this type of order from
a different aspect:
"[T]he Court manifestly has no jurisdiction to deny such petitions
with prejudice to filing for federal habeas corpus after exhausting
state remedies. . . . To accomplish such a result it would be
necessary, at least, for the Court to grant the writ, modify the
state court's judgment so as to attach the condition of prejudice,
and affirm it as so modified. The power to do this without a
plenary hearing, or even with it, may be doubted." 262
942 (1956) ; Bramble v. Heinze, 351 U.S. 989 (1956) ; Irvin v. Indiana, 353 U.S. 948
(1957); Dick v. Moore, 355 U.S. 850 (1957); Davis v. Pepersack, 354 U.S. 941
(1957); Carmen v. Dickson, 355 U.S. 924 (1958); Tuscano v. Texas, 358 U.S. 857
(1958); Bailey v. Arkansas, 358 U.S. 869 (1958); Horn v. Washington, 358 U.S.
900 (1958); Jackson v. Banmiler, 358 U.S. 923 (1958); Burman v. Florida, 358
U.S. 937 (1959); Deese v. Culver, 359 U.S. 920 (1959); Grace v. California, 360
U.S. 940 (1959) ; Powell v. Ohio, 359 U.S. 964 (1959). [Hereinafter these cases will
be cited by the name of the petitioner only.]
259 Prior to 1950, the Court occasionally used the "without prejudice" formula
in disposing of motions for leave to file for original habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Francis v. Resweber, 331 U.S. 786 (1947); Ex parte Hawk, 318
U.S. 746 (1943). During the same period, the Court used a similar order in returning
cases to state courts for further proceedings when some development in state law
seemed to open up a postconviction remedy. See Franklin v. Maxwell, 340 U.S. 956
(1951) ; Marks v. Ragen, 339 U.S. 926 (1950) ; Willis v. Ragen, 338 U.S. 944 (1950) ;
Pippin v. Nierstheimer, 337 U.S. 942 (1949); cf. Cato v. California, 348 U.S. 850
(1954) ; see also Hurley v. Ragen, 356 U.S. 42 (1958). The Supreme Court's earliest
use of the "without prejudice" order in a state custody situation appears to be Miller
v. Dowd, 322 U.S. 759 (1944). See also ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 316 n.28 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland
1951).
260 The case most frequently cited for this proposition is United States v. Carver,
260 U.S. 482 (1923).
261344 U.S. 443 (1953). Justice Frankfurter's view, id. at 488-97, was accepted
by a majority of the Court. See id. at 487-88 (Justice Burton and Justice Clark) ;
id. at 513 (Justice Black and Justice Douglas). Attached to Justice Frankfurter's
opinion was a report of a case study which showed that there are insurmountable
difficulties in a rule which would attribute any significance to a denial of certiorari.
Id. at 514-32.
262 Hart, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
114 n.88 (1959). Professor Hart believes that the practice is "explicable only as a
bit of gratuitous legal aid to prisoners combined with extracurricular communications
of Delphic encouragement to federal district judges." Ibid. Compare the even more
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The qualified denial of certiorari has met with mixed reaction in
lower federal court opinions in those nine cases in which proceedings
were reported subsequent to a denial without prejudice.
263 Most of
the federal judges have ignored the order except, perhaps, to note its
existence in stating the history of the case. One judge held that the
order constrained him to decide the merits of the prisoner's claim
despite the judge's conclusion that the prisoner had not yet exhausted
his state remedies.2 64 In the Chessman case, the district court described
the without-prejudice order as an "invitation" to Chessman to apply
for federal habeas corpus,265 and later Chief Judge Denman deemed
the qualification "highly significant" as an indication of the Supreme
Court's belief that the case presented a "justiciable question." 266
Another district judge conjectured that the Court's denial of certiorari
indicated its belief that the petitioner should be refused relief, even
though he had been convicted in violation of the Constitution! 
26 7
The most likely key to the riddle of the order's meaning appears
in the opinions of the Supreme Court itself. In White v. Ragen,266 the
Court said:
strange denial of certiorari in Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220 (1958). See
Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions: An Interplay of
Appellate Ambiguity and District Court Discretion, 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958).
263 Dick v. Moore, 261 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); United States
ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Bailey v. Henslee, 168
F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Ark. 1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1959); Petition of
Carmen, 165 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Davis v. Pepersack, 155 F. Supp. 550
(D. Md. 1957), aff'd in; part, dismissed in part, 255 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Applica-
tion of Landeros, 154 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.J. 1957); Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531
(N.D. Ind. 1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'd and remanded, 359 U.S.
394 (1959); Application of Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Cal.), certificate of
prob. cause granted, 219 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 221 F.2d 276 (9th Cir), revd
and remanded, 350 U.S. 3 (1955) (per curiam) ; United States ex rel. Sheffield v.
Waller, 126 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. La. 1954), certificate of prob. cause denied, 224 F.2d
280 (5th Cir.), cert. under 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (1958) denied, 350 U.S. 922 (1955).
The only one of these cases in which the Supreme Court wrote an opinion was
Irvin v. Dowd, mepra. The Court referred to its previous "without prejudice" order
in stating the history of the case, but attributed no significance to that fact in its
analysis.
264 Application of Landeros, supra note 263.
265 128 F. Supp. at 601.
266 219 F.2d at 164.
267 United States ex rel. Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1959). Even
though the only evidence of guilt was a confession brutally coerced from the defend-
ant, the district judge believed that the prisoner was a dangerous person whom the
state would have difficulty convicting again because the passage of time would make
gathering evidence almost impossible. In conjecturing that this rationale may have
influenced the Supreme Court when certiorari was denied, the district court did not
mention that the denial of certiorari had been qualified by the "without prejudice"
phrase, id. at 747, although the court had noted that fact in its recital of the history
of the case. Id. at 735.
268324 U.S. 760, 765 (1945).
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"[W]hen this Court denies or dismisses certiorari . . . with-
out passing on the merits, it may, as in the present case, be of
importance to the administration of justice in the federal district
courts, that we indicate authoritatively for their guidance the view
we take of the availability of the state remedies, and the reasons
for our decision."
The Court went on to explain that whenever a state court judgment
might rest on an adequate nonfederal ground, even though there are
federal questions presented, it is unnecessary to apply for certiorari.
"A denial of certiorari by this Court in such circumstances does not
bar an application to a federal district court for the relief, grounded on
federal rights, which the [state court] . . . has denied." 269
The Supreme Court, in Darr v. Burford,"' commented directly
upon a "without prejudice" order which had been issued earlier that
same term in Burke v. GeorgiaY.2 1  The majority said that the order
is used where the Court has doubts concerning the basis of the state
court judgment. Such doubts may arise, said the Court, from the
intermixing of issues of state procedure, questions of fact regarding
the alleged violations of constitutional rights, and issues of law regard-
ing the scope of constitutional rights. 2 The dissent agreed: the order
"merely demonstrates how frequently in this situation preliminary
questions of State procedure and State court jurisdiction are in-
volved." 273
As in White v. Ragen, the Court was again referring to the
familiar doctrine that it lacks jurisdiction to review a state judgment
which rests upon an independent and adequate nonfederal ground.
Under this doctrine, the Court has said it lacks jurisdiction even if
the basis for the state judgment is a matter of doubt.2 4  Such doubts
can easily arise where issues of state procedure are intertwined with
federal questions. The Court in Darr v. Burford also cited a practical
impediment to Supreme Court review as a cause for using the "with-
out prejudice" formula. Unresolved questions of fact in the record
serve to frustrate meaningful appellate review. The existence of such
doubts might lead the Court to refuse the writ of certiorari.
It is not unreasonable to conclude, even from this rather sparse
evidence, that the "without prejudice" order is a shorthand expression
269 Id. at 767. See note 169 supra.
270 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
271338 U.S. 941 (1950).
272 339 U.S. at 215.
2 7 3 Id. at 232.
274 See note 219 supra.
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of the Court signifying the basis for denial of certiorari in these cases.
But this does not solve the riddle entirely. Over the course of the
past ten years, there must have been many more than 19 cases in which
certiorari was denied on the bases described in the Court's opinions.
The state postconviction procedures alone, because of their very poor
quality, have produced innumerable state judgments outside the scope
of Supreme Court review. Some additional factor must be operating
to set these cases apart from the others.
One possibility is that the "without prejudice" order has some ef-
fect upon the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies." 5 While
the exhaustion requirement is not directly relevant to the Court's juris-
diction to review the judgments of state courts, the Court does stand
at the end of the state review system in its pivotal position between
state proceedings and federal habeas corpus."76 It is difficult to imagine
what the order might mean in terms of the exhaustion rule, however,
or why it might be deemed necessary.
A far more likely explanation of the strange order is linked with
the Supreme Court's impression of the merits of the cases. The Court
said in Darr v. Burford that the "without prejudice" order is used
where there is an impediment to certiorari review of a state judgment.2
77
In the same case, the Court accepted the principle that it, rather than
the lower federal courts, should reverse state judgments in criminal
cases where the state courts had made erroneous decisions on matters
of federal law. The special obligation to grant certiorari in these cases,
taken together with an obstacle preventing the Court from fulfilling its
responsibility, makes it reasonable to suppose that the "without prej-
udice" order means that, but for the impediment in the case, certiorari
would have been granted.
The hypothesis that the "without prejudice" order is used to in-
dicate a case in which the Supreme Court would have exercised its
review power if some impediment had not existed receives substantial
support from a study made of the 19 cases in which the order has ap-
peared. An examination of the papers available to the Court when it
entered the qualified denial showed that most of the cases fall relatively
neatly into two categories: either there was a nonfederal ground to
support the state judgment or the factual record in the case was cloudy.
27528 U.S.C. §2254 (1958).
2 76 In one of the 19 orders, the Court added a further proviso to its order, saying
that the denial was without prejudice to a federal habeas corpus application "after
exhausting state remedies." Irvin. This logically indicates that the meaning of the
simple "without prejudice" order does not concern the exhaustion rule.
277 See notes 270-73 supra and accompanying text.
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Twelve of the 19 cases can be classified in the former group.2 8
In nine of these, the highest state court wrote an opinion 279 -one at
the request of the Supreme Court 2 8 0-which indicated that the state
court believed its judgment rested on a state ground. The Burke case 281
is illustrative. The proceedings in the state courts were by way of an
extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that the conviction
had been obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony by
the prosecution. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the alleged
perjurer. The Supreme Court of Georgia assumed the alleged facts to
be true but denied relief, relying on a state statute which forbade setting
aside judgments on the ground of perjury unless the perjurer had been
convicted for his offense. The state court declared that the statute
"is but the exercise of the sovereign right of the State to fix rules of
evidence. . . . [T]he only evidence which will prove the allegations
of the movant is a judgment convicting the witness of perjury." 
282
Several of these cases rest upon a state ruling that the federal
claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata.28 3  The now
famous Chessman case was one of these. Chessman filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, alleging that the
transcript of his trial had been fraudulently prepared. He filed this
petition immediately after learning, among other things, that the person
hired by the prosecutor to transcribe the shorthand notes of the de-
ceased reporter was the uncle of the prosecutor's wife. The state court
denied the petition summarily and without opinion. While an applica-
tion for certiorari was pending in the Supreme Court of the United
States, the California court, in a collateral proceeding, filed a lengthy
opinion explaining its previous dismissal. 4 The court said that Chess-
man had charged fraud in the preparation of the record in a prior
278 Bailey, Bramble, Burke, Carmen, Chessman, Davis, Deese, Grace, Irvin, Reck,
Scalf, Sheffield.
279 Bailey v. State, 313 S.W.2d 388 (Ark. 1958); In re Bramble, unpublished
opinion of California Supreme Court, Feb. 21, 1956; Application of Carmen, 48
Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957) ; In re Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 391, 408, 274 P.2d 645
(1954) ; People v. Grace, 166 Cal. App. 2d 68, 332 P.2d 811 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958),
leave to appeal denied, 166 Cal. App. 2d 79 (1959) ; Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54
S.E.2d 350 (1949); Davis v. Warden, 211 Md. 606, 125 A.2d 841 (1956); Irvin v.
State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898 (1957) ; Reck v. People, 7 Ill. 2d 261, 130 N.E.2d
200 (1955).
280 Bramble v. Heinze, 350 U.S. 899 (1955).
281 Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54 S.E2d 350 (1949).
282 Id. at 659-60, 54 S.E.2d at 353.
283 In re Bramble, unpublished opinion of the California Supreme Court, Feb.
21, 1956; Application of Carmen, 48 Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957) ; Application of
Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 391, 408, 274 P.2d 645 (1954); Davis v. Warden, 211 Md. 606,
125 A.2d 841 (1956).
284 Application of Chessman, supra note 283. This proceeding was technically on
motion to vacate a stay of execution entered by one member of the California Supreme
Court. Ex parte Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 296, 273 P.2d 263 (1954).
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application for habeas corpus. Chessman's new discoveries constituted
merely new "evidence" and not "ultimate facts." Therefore, the cause
of action being the same, the application had been denied." 5
In three more of the state-ground cases, the state courts wrote no
opinions. 8" All three were applications for discretionary relief in the
state courts, leaving in doubt the exact basis for their decision." 7 There
was a brief in opposition from the state attorney general in two of
these, urging the Court that the state judgment rested on a state ground
or grounds.
28 8
There were six cases in which there was no state ground imme-
diately apparent. 9 Rather the state court judgment was based upon
a factual record which left something to be desired. In one state habeas
corpus case, the court based its decision on certificates of the original
trial judge and defense counsel, but those certificates were not before
the Supreme Court.' Another state habeas corpus case, involving,
in part, a charge that the trial judge had been prejudiced, was heard
by the same judge who had presided at the original trial. 9 In the
remaining four cases there were other doubts on the soundness of the
factual record. 9 2
285 Other nonfederal grounds found to support the state judgment included for-
feiture of post-trial procedure by an escapee (Irvin), failure to raise an issue in timely
fashion (Bailey), and two holdings that whether a confession is coerced is a question
for the jury (Grace, Reck).286 Deese, Scalf, Sheffield.287 Deese applied for habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. Scalf made
a similar application in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Sheffield
petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ of certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition. Since all of these were denied without opinion, it cannot
be known whether the state court refused to entertain the application or, having
considered it, found it without merit.
288 In Deese, the Brief in Opposition stated that the petition for certiorari con-
tained detailed allegations which had never been presented to the state court. Opposing
the Scalf petition, the state said that the allegations had not been adequately raised,
with supporting affidavits, in the state court or were outside the scope of the state
habeas corpus remedy.289 Burman, Horn, Jackson, Landeros, Powell, Tuscano. In Burman and Jackson,
there were no opinions in the state courts. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
filed an unpublished opinion in the Tuscano case. There were state court opinions
published in the remaining three cases. Horn v. Washington, 52 Wash. 2d 613, 328
P.2d 159 (1958) (per curiam) ; State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 76, 118 A.2d 524 (1955) ;
State v. Powell, 105 Ohio App. 529, 148 N.E.2d 230 (1957), appeal dismissed, 167
Ohio St. 319, 148 N.E.2d 232 (1958).2 9 0 
TusCano.
291 Jackson.
292 In Horn, the state supreme court had appointed a master to conduct an in-
quiry into the facts, but it was not clear how much of the master's findings were adopted
by the court. Horn v. Washington, 52 Wash. 2d 613, 328 P.2d 159 (1958) (per
curiam). In Landeros, the state supreme court, on appeal from the conviction, agreed
to look at certain documents not actually part of the record, containing information
which the prosecution was asserted to have suppressed at the trial. The status of
this material was rather unclear. State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 76, 118 A.2d 524 (1955).
There is some doubt in Burman and Powell as to the federal questions involved. Each
certiorari petition suggested that there may have been a problem of denial of appeal
similar to Griffin v. Illinois, but the exact factual history on this point was not clear
in either case.
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One case is difficult to catalogue. The Supreme Court went to
elaborate lengths over a period of several years to find out the basis of-
a state court's judgment summarily denying an application for habeas
corpus. 93 When it was finally discovered that the state decision prob-
ably went to the merits, the Court tried to find the record of the original
trial. This effort proved futile and the Court finally denied certiorari
without prejudice.
This covers the 19 cases from the perspective of possible reasons
why the Court did not grant certiorari. But the hypothesis was that
these were cases which the Court, but for the difficulties discussed,
would or might have agreed to hear. Can any evidence be adduced on
this score?
This is more difficult, naturally, but there are some relevant points.
Unlike the mine run of prisoner applications, these cases, with minor
exception, clearly point to specific constitutional rights allegedly denied
to the petitioners. The petitions were also reasonably clear on the
factual history of the cases giving rise to the federal questions. In 12
of the 19 cases, the state court had summarily denied relief so that the
case stood on the allegations.294
293Dicds petition was a simple, brief, neatly handwritten document alleging
facts, which if true, would constitute a clear violation of the constitutional right to
counsel. A habeas corpus petition in the same tenor had been summarily dismissed
without explanation by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Supreme Court
files show the following developments:
First, the state attorney general was asked to respond. An answer was received
one year after the petition for certiorari had been filed. The Texas official informed
the Court that the petitioner had two separate convictions and was not then serving
the one complained of. Attached to this memorandum was a copy of the prison record
totally refuting the statement in the memorandum and revealing rather that the
earlier sentence had expired prior to the petition for habeas corpus in the state court.
A second response was sought from the attorney general. This one brought two
replies, received by the Court three days apart. One was a memorandum answering
three questions about Texas habeas corpus practice. The attorney general informed
the court that habeas corpus was an available remedy in Texas, that the Court of
Crimiial Appeals was an appropriate forum in which to petition for such relief, and
that the Court of Criminal Appeals always stated expressly the ground for denial of
the petition if not on the merits. The second, styled an "Answer," announced to the
Court that the prisoner had not shown any special circumstances for the need of
counsel in a non-capital case. The petition alleged not only a refusal to appoint
counsel for a young defendant facing a possible sentence of life imprisonment if con-
victed, but further alleged a refusal of a continuance to allow time to obtain his own
lawyer.
At this juncture, the Clerk of the Supreme Court undertook to find the transcript
of the original trial. A letter to the County Attorney of the place of trial brought
a reply that there was no copy of the transcript available, none having been made
since the defendant had not appealed. The reporter at the trial, he added, was believed
to be somewhere in New Mexico. Another letter to the District Clerk of the county
court brought the same response on the situs of the reporter plus the additional
erroneous statement that petitioner had pleaded guilty. The Court apparently did not
try to find the reporter in New Mexico. It denied certiorari without prejudice.




Where a record did exist, it supported the contentions of the state
prisoner. In the Reck case, the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court
describes, as undisputed facts, evidence of one of the most brutally
coerced confessions in the annals of constitutional law.2 95 And in Horn,
the state court found that, in the course of obtaining a confession, the
police had taken their prisoner without cause to a cemetery, although the
court did not credit that the police had threatened to throw him into
an open grave unless he confessed. 96
The evidence at hand tends to bear out the hypothesis that the
Supreme Court would probably have granted certiorari in these 19 cases
had there not been an impediment to their effectively reaching the merits
of the case. But why make an announcement of that fact, especially
one so cryptic as this one is? Why not a simple denial of certiorari?
The answer to this question is pure speculation, but several pos-
sibilities suggest themselves. Professor Hart thought the order might
be in the nature of legal aid for the prisoner, telling him his next pro-
cedural step.29 7 This is hardly consistent with the fact that half of these
petitioners already had lawyers, 298 although it is not beyond reason to
suppose that lawyers could use some advice, too. Professor Hart also
suggested that the order might be an extracurricular communication of
Delphic encouragement to the federal district court. But encourage-
ment to do what? Grant relief? This is unacceptable, especially since
most of the cases rested on pleadings at the Supreme Court stage.
A more reasonable interpretation is that the Supreme Court is
encouraging, or even ordering,299 the district courts to make an in-
dependent inquiry into the case. The Court in White v. Ragen said
that its reason for making known the basis for its refusal of certiorari
was to provide guidance for federal district courts."' 0 Earlier in the
same paragraph of that opinion, the Court said: "If this Court denies
certiorari after a state court decision on the merits, or if it reviews the
case on the merits, a federal district court will not usually reexamine
on habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated." 801 The importance
of the announcement apparently is to inform the federal courts that
this is a case which should be reexamined.
295 Reck v. People, 7 II1. 2d 261, 130 N.E.2d 200 (1955).
296 Horn v. Washington, 52 Wash. 2d 613, 328 P.2d 159 (1958) (per curiam).
297 See note 262 supra.
298 Burke, Carmen, Landeros, Reck and Sheffield had counsel of record. Bailey
and Irvin had attorneys who were not members of the Supreme Court bar so that,
officially, the prisoners petitioned pro se. There is reason to believe, from the quality
of the petitions, that Horn and Jackson were represented by lawyers.
299 See Application of Landeros, 154 F. Supp. 183 (D.N.J. 1957).
800 White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 765 (1945).
301 Id. at 764-65.
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Fundamental to this reasoning is the premise that the impediment
preventing the Supreme Court from reviewing the state judgment
would not also bar federal habeas corpus. This is certainly true when
the reason for denial of certiorari is an uncertainty on questions of fact
which may cloud the record compiled in the state court proceedings.
Federal habeas corpus provides a method for further inquiry into the
issues of fact. It must also be true where the state judgment rests upon
an adequate state ground.30 2  Otherwise it would make no sense to
transfer the case out of the state proceedings into federal habeas corpus.
The whole purpose is to get potentially meritorious cases away from
the impediments which foreclose review by the Supreme Court by di-
recting them into a proceeding in which these impediments will not
apply.
If the analysis suggested here correctly interprets the meaning of
the "without prejudice" orders, the Court's practice can be regretted on
two scores. In the first place, it is not being understood. There is no
point at all in making an announcement which does not communicate,
or worse yet, is misconstrued. The little evidence now existing tends
to show that the order is usually ignored.
The second level of doubt concerns the effect which the order has
on the cases which fail to win the "flag." Particularly if the trend
toward increasing use of the order continues, a simple denial will become
more and more a badge of no-merit. No amount of protestation will
overcome the negative inference that such an explanation, in the eyes of
the Supreme Court, lacks any substance.
There is, to be sure, another side to the issue. Most of these cases
were collateral attacks in the state courts.3"3 Without a doubt, the most
difficult hurdle for a state prisoner seeking collateral relief to overcome
is to get a hearing on the merits of his constitutional assertions. The
great bulk of such applications are summarily denied on the papers
filed. This is true, not only in the state courts, but in the federal courts
as well. Accordingly, when the Supreme Court believes that a case
does present a serious question worth a hearing, there is a good reason
for not throwing it back into relative oblivion.
302 This proposition is directly contrary to the position taken by Professor Henry
Hart in Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959).
Professor Hart elaborated upon the argument advanced by justice Frankfurter and
Justice Harlan in their dissenting opinions in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 407, 412
(1959). The majority of the Court in the Irvin case did not agree that the adequate-
state-ground rule is applicable to determine the scope of federal habeas corpus; at
no time has the Court ever accepted the Frankfurter-Harlan-Hart position. Even
though lacking in precedent, however, the views of such eminent lawyers deserve
greater attention than can be devoted to them in this Article. It is hoped that they
can be treated more fully in a future essay.




At the Supreme Court stage, the choice is a difficult one. Where
the state court has relied on a procedural issue, the only way in which
the Court itself could reach the underlying merits would require holding
that the state ground is not "adequate." The Court would then be in
a position to demand that the courts of the state afford the prisoner a
hearing before a decision on his federal claims. However, this would
manifestly compound the irritation to federal-state relations. Not only
would there be a federal question in the validity of the original convic-
tion, but now there would be the additional federal intrusion in the state
procedures for litigating that question. Some state-styled rules of
pleading and evidence3 .4 would fall before a federal holding that they
are "inadequate."
The alternative choice of federal habeas corpus is, by comparison,
far more attractive. And, indeed, if the state judgment rests on a
cloudy factual record, the federal habeas corpus hearing may be in-
dispensable.0 5 The pivot from the state proceedings to the federal
habeas corpus stage could technically be accomplished by a simple denial
of certiorari. But the effect of denial without a flag might be to return
the case to obscurity.
Despite these factors, it seems that this risk should nonetheless
be taken. The same qualities which made the case stand out in the
Supreme Court will probably have the same effect in a federal district
court. If the Court were so inclined, they might keep an internal record
of these cases so that, if the case did subsequently go up the federal
habeas corpus ladder without being given a hearing, the case could
then be remanded openly and directly to the district court. While this
method has risks, 8' it does not entail the great possibility of serious
prejudice to other petitioners. Already the district courts are inclined
to construe a simple denial of certiorari as prejudicial. If a qualified
denial means what has been suggested, and that meaning becomes gen-
erally known and understood, aggravation of this condition seems in-
evitable.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION To CHANGE THE FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION
During the present session of Congress, we may witness the extra-
ordinary event of the passage of a bill which no one seems really to
304 See, e.g., Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949), supra notes
281-82 and accompanying text. Application of Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 391, 408, 274 P.2d
645 (1954), supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E2d 749, vacated and remanded,
350 U.S. 891 (1955), prior decision re-affired, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal
dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
306E.g., the state prisoner may be nearing the end of his sentence and fail to
seek further remedy, particularly if he believes that to do so might jeopardize his
chance for parole.
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want."°  It has already been passed in the House of Representatives 8 08
and may be approved in the Senate this year, perhaps without hearings
in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 09 The bill, if enacted, would make
three substantial changes in the law concerning federal habeas corpus:
First, it provides that no relief can be granted except by a three-
judge federal district court, although single district judges would con-
tinue to screen applications and would retain the power to deny relief.3 1 °
Second, the courts of appeals would be eliminated from the channel
of appellate review of any case decided by a three-judge district court:
regardless of whether the ruling is in favor of the petitioner or in favor
of the state, the case could be taken only to the Supreme Court."'
Moreover, unlike every other three-judge court proceeding, review in
the Supreme Court would be a matter of discretion, sought by way of
a petition for certiorari."
Third, the proposed statute would incorporate some concepts of
res judicata into habeas corpus practice.3 13  Its provisions contain some
ambiguous matters, but quite apart from technical or drafting problems,
the suggestion to apply res judicata to federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings is, in itself, extremely disturbing.
307 H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The proponents of legislative change
have b5een principally the state chief justices and attorneys general. The latter group
implicitly repudiated the current bill by reaffirming its support of the very different
legislation passed by the House of Representatives in the 84th and 85th Congresses.
National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution XI, Habeas Corpus, May 7,
1959. The Chairman of the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Conference of
Chief Justices informed Congress that he was "vigorously opposed" to the current
bill. 105 CONG. REc. 13364 (daily ed. July 29, 1959). The Conference disapproved of
the bill in its present form and reasserted its support of the prior proposed legislation.
Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution on Habeas Corpus, Miami Beach, Fla., Aug.
18-23, 1959. For a history of the legislation see H.R. REP. No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5 (1959).
308 105 CONG. REc. 13365 (daily ed. July 29, 1959).
309 In the 85th Congress, after the House had passed H.R. 8361, the Senate
judiciary Committee reported the bill favorably without having conducted any hear-
ings. S. REP. No. 2280, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See Hearings Before Sub-
committee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 2, at 41-42 (1959).
310 H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1959). This part of the bill would be
an addition to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
311 H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1959). This would be an amendment
to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1958). Where relief is denied by a single district judge, the
channel of appellate review to the court of appeals would not be changed by the new
legislation. The provisions of § 2253 would remain applicable.
3
1 2 H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1959). Supreme Court review by
appeal in other cases is provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
313 H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1959). This would amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244 (1958). Separate sections would provide different rules of finality for judg-
ments of the Supreme Court and decisions of lower federal courts.
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Three-Judge District Courts
Underlying the three-judge court proposal are probably two ends
sought to be served. One is reduction of delay in the enforcement of
a state judgment by telescoping the district court and court of appeals
functions into a single court. The other is amelioration of the affront
to the state courts which some people find present in federal habeas
corpus practice today, the assertedly doubtful "utility for dignified or
effective law enforcement of review and overturn by any federal judge
of the reasoned conclusions reached by a whole hierarchy of state
tribunals." 814
Undoubtedly the idea for the three-judge court was drawn from
section 2281 of the Judicial Code which requires such courts when
an injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement of a state statute
on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional. 15  That provision
was, to a large extent, motivated by "the indignity and injustice which
it was felt was being done to the states in having their solemn legislative
acts, and the efforts of state officers to enforce them, impeded, perhaps
frustrated, by the interlocutory fiat of a single judge. . .." "' In
the habeas corpus situation, the parallel is to the solemn judicial acts,
and the efforts of state officers to enforce them, which are being im-
peded, or perhaps frustrated.
The analogy, while verbally apposite, is not a true one. Where a
state legislative program is suspended or thwarted, the consequences
in total effect upon the state government transcend the immediate case.
The particular mischief is not the assault on a state statute, but the
use of the injunctive remedy. The original provision required the
special court only for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction.817
Later it was amended to include cases seeking permanent injunctions
as well. 8 ' But it has never been expanded to include all cases attack-
814 Judge Clark in United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698,
706 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955). For the
evident annoyance of state judges, see, e.g., Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution
on Habeas Corpus, Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 20, 1955: "At each of its meetings, begin-
ning in 1952, the Conference of Chief Justices has adopted resolutions to restrain the
improper use of writs of habeas corpus by prisoners who have been convicted in
state courts and who seek to have the action of state courts reviewed and reversed
by lower federal courts."
31528 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958). This same proposal was previously recommended
to Congress by the Judicial Conference of the United States. [1943] ADMINISTrATIVE
OFFIcE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 23; [1944] id. at 22. The proposal was
opposed by a considerable number of the federal district and circuit judges and was
withdrawn by the Judicial Conference. [1947] id. at 17-18.
816 Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 H!,v. L. Rrv. 795, 804 (1934).
See also id. at 805.
317 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557.
318 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat 938.
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ing a state statute as unconstitutional. A particular state prisoner seek-
ing discharge from custody on the ground that he was deprived of con-
stitutional rights is not seriously threatening the operation of state
government.
A further, less obvious defect in any analogy between the proposed
habeas corpus legislation and section 2281 lies in the assumption that
solemn judicial acts are being overturned. As the present survey of
cases in which federal relief was granted indicates, it is hardly ac-
curate to say that reasoned conclusions of a whole hierarchy of state
tribunals are being reversed. Only three of the cases might have
satisfied that statement. In the great majority of instances, the state
courts had given short shrift to the asserted constitutional claims or
had refused to decide the federal issues at all. Perhaps this indicates
that where the state proceedings are really solemn judicial acts, the
federal courts do not often reach contrary conclusions.3 19
There is reason to believe that the basic source of personal antag-
onism goes deeper than the simple comparison of the statures of courts.
Many state judges and officials have been disgruntled by the extent to
which the operation of the federal constitution has progressively ex-
panded in the administration of state criminal law.320 Under the aegis
of the Supreme Court the list of constitutional "don'ts" has grown
rapidly in the last quarter of a century, a development which has been
received with hostility in some state judicial systems. When these
constitutional norms are applied by lower federal courts, the sense of
outrage may be partially deflected from the norm to the court that
applies it.
The aim of reducing delay in enforcement of state judgments is
likewise not persuasive of the need for legislation. From the point of
view of the states, the factor of delay can be a grievance only where the
death penalty has been imposed. A sentence of imprisonment is being
enforced while the litigation proceeds. And in the class of death cases,
reasonable men may perhaps differ on whether haste and shortcuts are
appropriate when the subject is the taking of human life. Beyond this,
319 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sileo v. Martin, 269 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1959),
holding that the absence of findings of fact and opinions in the state collateral pro-
ceedings made it imperative for the federal district court to determine and evaluate
the facts.
320 E.g., this statement filed on behalf of the National Association of Attorneys
General: "Thus we have now reached the place where the 14th amendment as well
as all other nebulous, general, abstruse, and abstract Federal constitutional provisions
applicable to the States have [sic] become jurisdictional. . . . We cannot know how
many more [jurisdictional defects] will be invoked or conjured up out of that limit-
less, unchartered sea, the 14th amendment; we fold our arms and wait for the new
crop of 5-to-4 decisions." Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at 39, 41 (1955).
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it has never been demonstrated that the federal courts of appeals do
cause substantial delay in the execution of death sentences. Usually
such cases are given priority at all levels of the federal system. The
amount of time which would be saved by eliminating the intermediate
appellate level may, in fact, be completely offset by the time lost in
convening the three-judge district court. Finally, since death cases are
the only affected group, there seems no reason to change the procedures
of all cases in order to speed up one component group.
Apart from weakness in the arguments supporting the proposal,
there are important considerations which weigh against it. Perhaps
the strongest, at least the most obvious, is the need to avoid waste of
judicial manpower. The existing shortage of judges would be ag-
gravated by creating a new category of cases triable solely before a
three-judge district court; even though only a small number of cases of
this kind arose each year, the time lost would not be inconsequential.3 2'
A more speculative harm may be the lessening of the protection
currently afforded state prisoners in federal habeas corpus. The bill
would allow a single district judge to conduct a preliminary examina-
tion, in his discretion, before deciding what disposition shall be made
of the application, but presumably he would be precluded at that stage
from holding a hearing to receive testimony.322 A decision to look be-
yond documentary matters triggers the three-judge court clause. It
seems that this would lead, subtly or consciously, to some reticence to
go behind the documents. Whereas a single judge, under existing
practice, might conclude that he will invest some of his time in a pre-
liminary exploration of a "hunch" that a prisoner-drafted petition may
have merit, he may be less willing to do so if it necessitates the formal
convening of a three-judge court.
The reduction of the litigation time in federal habeas corpus in
non-death cases would appear to be of benefit to state prisoners seeking
relief. The time involved in successfully bringing a case through the
maze of federal and state courts is a matter of grave concern. But the
saving possibly made by elimination of the intermediate appellate
courts is more than offset by the prospective detrimental effects upon
321 See Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 391
(1934): "The three judge procedure is an extraordinary one, imposing a heavy
burden on federal courts, with attendant expense and delay. That procedure, de-
signed for a specific class of cases, sharply defined, should not be lightly extended."
322The bill provides that the single judge's examination "may be made upon
the allegations of the application only, or upon the allegations of the application, the
return to the order to show cause if such an order was issued, and any admissions
of fact, original or certified copies of State court records, and other pertinent docu-
mentary matter." H.R 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1959). While not overtly
stated, it is strongly implied that the single judge would not be authorized to obtain
information in any other way.
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the prisoners' chances of a hearing and relief. On balance, the sug-
gestion to set up a three-judge court procedure seems unwise.
Elimination of the Courts of Appeals
To the extent that there may be validity in the objection to the
unseemliness of a federal trial judge "reversing" a state supreme court,
the new legislation is a step in the wrong direction. Heretofore, a
state could almost invariably appeal the decision of a district court to
a court of appeals,323 and from that judgment could seek certiorari in
the Supreme Court. Under the pending bill, a case worthy of a hearing
would go before a three-judge district court, with possible certiorari to
the Supreme Court. A district court, even of three judges, is not the
equivalent in prestige or stature of a court of appeals.
From a different standpoint, the new legislation would undoubtedly
increase to some extent the burden upon the Supreme Court. When a
three-judge court has granted relief, the pressure to have at least one
stage of appellate review would be rather strong; 324 when it has refused
relief after a hearing, the Supreme Court would be the only agency to
insure that the decision was correct.
Res Judicata Provisions
The most dubious parts of the proposed statute would incorporate
some aspects of res judicata into the law of federal habeas corpus.325
323Under 28 U.S.C. §2253 (1958), an appeal may not be taken unless either
the district court or a circuit judge issues a certificate of probable cause. It is
not to be expected that a state would frequently be denied such a certificate. But
see Wailer v. United States ex rel. Sheffield, 224 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. under 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (1958) denied, 350 U.S. 922 (1955).
324 The Supreme Court has not frequently granted petitions for certiorari filed
by the states in federal habeas corpus proceedings heretofore. See notes 251-55 mtpra
and accompanying text.
325The federal proposal follows, in general, the approach taken to res judicata
in the state postconviction procedure acts. Illinois and North Carolina provide that
any claim not raised in the original petition is waived. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§828 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (Supp. 1959). The
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland and Oregon, also impose the
sanction of waiver as to claims not raised in the first petition, but these acts provide
an exception where the grounds asserted in a later petition could not reasonably
have been raised in an earlier one. UNrFORI PosT-CoNvwcTIoN PROCEDURE AcT
§ 8; MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 645H (Supp. 1959); Ore. Laws 1959, ch. 636,
§ 15(3). Oregon alone specifies the collateral effect of prior judgments on direct
review of the conviction and sentence. Id. at § 15(2). In all of these statutes, unlike
the proposed federal legislation, an indigent prisoner presumably has the right to the
assistance of counsel in preparing his first application for relief.
Several states have abrogated the common-law rule and created by statute res
judicata rules for habeas corpus judgments. An Indiana statute declares: "The
common law rules of res adjudicata shall apply to proceedings for writs of habeas
corpus in criminal matters." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3304 (1956). Arizona provides
for finality only if the prisoner has had a hearing. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2003
(1956). Four other states declare that habeas corpus judgments are conclusive
unless reversed. ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN., § 66-26-46 (1949) ; Miss. CODE ANN.,
§ 2836 (1956); ORE. REv. STAT. § 34.710 (Supp. 1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-605 (1957).
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No change would be made in the effect given to prior judgments of
state courts.328 One section would establish rules of estoppel for de-
cisions rendered by the Supreme Court in review of state judgments.3 27
Another describes the finality of federal habeas corpus judgments in-
sofar as subsequent applications for relief are made. 2s
The provision concerning Supreme Court review of state court
decisions declares that the "judgment of the Supreme Court .
shall be conclusive as to all rights, questions and facts actually ad-
judicated by the Supreme Court." 329 Apparently the draftsmen intend
to accord an effect like that of collateral estoppel to determinations of
the Supreme Court, while divorcing that Court's judgment from the
judgment of the state court from which the case comes and to which it
returns. If the Supreme Court reverses the state court disposition, the
rule would not be especially difficult of operation.3" Complications in
determining what was "actually adjudicated" may arise, however, when
the Supreme Court affirms.3 31  Perhaps all that is meant is that, where
rights, questions or facts are discussed and determined in an opinion of
the Court, this determination is binding.
The purpose and necessity for this provision are not clear. Under
present law, the lower federal courts are theoretically free to reexamine
any question decided by the Supreme Court on direct review of a state
judgment. The Supreme Court's decision is no more binding than
the state judgment, if the two can be separated for this purpose. But
as a matter of practicality, lower federal courts are not likely to disagree
with a positive expression by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the purpose of this provision is to make clear that any-
thing less than an actual adjudication by the Supreme Court, par-
ticularly denial of certiorari, has no binding effect upon the federal
habeas corpus proceeding. Since denials of certiorari do not now op-
erate to foreclose the habeas corpus inquiry, there would be no change
Several states require that an application for habeas corpus must disclose prior pro-
ceedings seeking relief, with no prescribed effect to follow from the prior judgment
so that the matter presumably is left in the discretion of the judge. HAwAII REv.
LAws § 239-5 (1955) ; IowA CODE A_-NN. § 663.1 (1950) ; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 1234;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1807 (1955) ; TEXAS CODE CRIn. PROC. ANN. art. 171 (1954);
UTAH R. Civ. P. 65B (f) (1) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-810 (1957).
326The standards laid down in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), would con-
tinue to be applicable.
327H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, adding § 2244(c) to the Judicial Code.
328 Ibid., adding § 2244(b) to the Code.
329 There would be an exception to the rule where the applicant pleads and proves
the existence of a material and controlling fact which did not appear in the record in
the Supreme Court and which the applicant could not have caused to appear by the
exercise of reasonable diligence.
330 Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 69 (1942).
331 This would require inquiry into the issues necessary to support the judgment
and within the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court, as limited by the questions
presented to the Court and, further, by the questions which the Court agreed to decide.
19601
520 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108:461
in the present law,832 but conceivably the intendment is to correct the
practice of some lower federal courts. If so, perhaps a more direct
statement would be appropriate.
The provision giving conclusive effect to prior federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings is far more stringent in its terms. It provides that a
subsequent application "shall not be entertained . . except on a
factual or other ground not presented at the hearing on the earlier
application for the writ and then only on a showing of a reasonable
excuse for failure to present such factual or other ground at the hearing
on the earlier application.""' 3  This represents the full sweep of res
judicata, taking in all issues which were or might have been presented
in an earlier proceeding, although the rigor of the conventional rule
would be modified to let the prisoner show "reasonable excuse." 3'4
A serious defect in this section is the ambiguity on what judg-
ments would be given res judicata effect. By its terms, the section
applies whenever a state prisoner "has been denied . . . release from
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus."
Every time a federal judge summarily dismisses an application, he has
denied the prisoner release from custody. Regardless of the extent
of consideration given, the statutory standard would be met. Under
the new one-judge, three-judge court arrangement, this section would
therefore apply not only to decisions by a three-judge court but also to
decisions of a single judge.
This would have the unfortunate consequence of making the pris-
oner's fate turn on how well or poorly he drafted his first application.
After the first one is denied, he would have not only to overcome the
obstacle of writing a legal document by himself, but would face the
further barrier of res judicata. The weakest point in the entire system
of postconviction remedies for state prisoners is the burden placed upon
them to perform legal tasks without legal counsel, legal skills or ade-
quate legal materials. To add further strain at that point of weakness
seems undesirable. 3 5
There is some reason to believe that this was not the intention of
the draftsmen. In the exception clause, defining matters which might
$32 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
333 H.R. 3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, adding § 2244(b) to the Code.
334 Compare the state statutes discussed in note 325 supra.
385 It is conceivable but not at all certain that the bill, if enacted, would be inter-
preted to limit the operation of the res judicata provision to cases in which the
prisoner was represented by an attorney. If this is the intention, it would seem far
better to provide directly that indigent petitioners seeking habeas corpus shall be
provided with counsel. This is the approach of the UmFoiu POsT-CoNvicrzON PRO-
cEDuRE Act § 5. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 829 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 27, § 645E (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1933); Ore.
Laws 1959, ch. 636, §9.
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be entertained, the bill twice refers to a prior "hearing." 336 In the
sections dealing with the three-judge courts, it is provided that the
single judge may hold a "preliminary examination" but it is for the
three-judge court "to hear and determine the issue." Conceivably,
therefore, the new proposal is meant to apply only to judgments of the
three-judge courts.837 If so, the bill surely ought to be changed to
remove the ambiguity.
Regardless of the extent to which it operates, any provision which
forbids consideration of an issue which might have been but which was
not raised at some earlier stage is open to question. The effect is to
preclude a decision on the actual merits of a controversy. The purpose
apparently is to reduce the number of repetitive applications for federal
habeas corpus relief.
It is yet to be demonstrated that this problem is substantial in
federal habeas corpus. Even if such a problem does exist, it is not
altogether clear how the application of res judicata rules is expected to
stem the flow of repetitive petitions. Perhaps it is assumed that there
are petitioners who deliberately withhold their constitutional claims,
using them one at a time to make a series of applications for relief.
Such a person, assuming knowledge of the statute, would perhaps be
influenced to offer all his claims in one petition. But this image of the
application process seems unreal. One would rather suppose that a
prisoner would aggregate all his claims together in the hope that the
totality of asserted errors would bulk larger than the sum of the parts.
The rule may be intended not to cut down the number of applica-
tions filed but to make it easier to dispose of them after they are filed.
It might be assumed, for example, that a second or third application
from the same man has no likelihood of merit. On discovering the
fact of earlier application, a later petition could be dismissed without
3 36 See text at note 333 supra.
337Some evidence that it was not the intention of the draftsmen to restrict the
application of res judicata to cases heard by a three-judge court is seen in the pro-
posed amendment of the present § 2244 of the Judicial Code to eliminate its applica-
bility in all cases involving state prisoners, not simply those decided by a three-judge
court. For the present effect of that section see notes 340-41 infra.
338 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts made a statistical study
of several selected federal judicial districts for the fiscal years 1943 to 1945. Speck,
Statistlics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHIo ST. LJ. 337, 352-353 (1949). Appar-
ently no more recent study has ever been made, since this data is part of the most
recent reports of the Administrative Office to Congress. H.R. REP'. No. 548, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1959). While this study indicates a relatively high percentage
of repeater petitions, the statistics are not a reliable indication of current practice.
These were the years of extraordinary legal activity by the inmates of Illinois jails.
More than two-thlirds of the petitions included in the study came from Illinois federal
courts. Of the 366 repeater petitions reported to have been filed, 238 were in Illinois.
Ten of the 13 petitioners who filed more than two petitions were in Illinois. Since the
data reflect an extraordinary condition, the study cannot possibly be representative
of the present situation.
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reading. The statute, however, does not set up such an automatic bar
to subsequent applications. It first has to be ascertained whether the
current petition is on grounds different from those of previous petitions
and, if different, whether there is a "reasonable excuse." By the time
that this kind of searching comparison is made, more time may have
been spent than would have been required to make an independent
evaluation of the worth of the petition in itself.
An even more fundamental question than whether the statute
would serve its purpose is whether res judicata doctrines might not
work a gross injustice. If it is correct that the statute would have no
substantial effect upon the applications of petitioners, then any gain in
the efficiency with which second applications might be disposed of by
the district courts is offset by the harsh penalty imposed on those who
fail to raise a possibly meritorious claim in their first application. Ad-
mittedly the statute says that the way is open to consider the claim if
there is a reasonable excuse for the failure to raise it earlier. But if
the basic facts were known, and only their legal signficance or a better
alternative constitutional characterization was not seen, 33 9 the chance
that ignorance would be "reasonable" seems questionable. The cost of
at best a minimal gain in efficiency may turn out to be rather high in
human terms.
The legislative history does not indicate what "mischief" in the
present law necessitates a change. Under section 2244 of the Code, a
federal judge is not required to entertain a repeater's application if it
presents no ground not theretofore presented and determined and the
judge is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by further
inquiry.3 40 The result is a rather general grant of discretion to refuse
to entertain an application. This permits the judge to take into account
the nature and extent of the former proceedings as a discretionary
factor to be considered with the apparent merit or lack of merit in the
current application.
The mandatory language of the proposed statute declares that a
second application "shall not be entertained" unless an exception to the
res judicata rule can be shown. Obviously this would narrow the
discretion now exercised by a district court to determine the effect of
prior proceedings. One might suppose that such a change would result
339 For example, in the Massey case the element of insanity affected the com-
petence of the defendant to stand trial without counsel as well as the question whether
he could be tried at all. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954). See also Cicenia v.
Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
34028 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958). This section, incorporated into the Judicial Code
in 1948, was said by the revisers to make no material change in prior practice. Re-
visers Note following 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958). The leading federal case is Salinger
v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924). See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
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from a conclusion that the present Code provision or its application is
unsatisfactory. 4 1 If that is not true, the proposal to rigidify the rules
is unnecessary and, since it creates the likelihood of grave in'justice,
ought to be disapproved.
With all its defects, the presently proposed statute is incomparably
superior to the bill which was passed by the House of Representatives
in the 84th and 85th Congresses. 342  That bill was designed to curtail
sharply the scope of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.34 3  Its
principal sponsors believed that the federal courts had distorted the
Great Writ by expanding its use and that there was need for legisla-
tion to return it to its historic, and much narrower, scope.34 4 One
vestige of that attitude was retained in a provision of the current bill
as approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States,34 5 but the
chairman of the Conference committee on habeas corpus suggested
elimination of the provision in his testimony before the House sub-
committee which held hearings on the bill.346 His suggestion was
341 For the practice of federal judges in cases involving state prisoners, see
United States ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 245 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 915 (1958) ; Chapman v. Teets, 241 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1957) ; United States
ex rel. Farnsworth v. Murphy, 207 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Ex parte Farrell, 189
F.2d 540 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 342 U.S. 839 (1951) ; Pagett v. McCauley, 95 F.2d
839 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Lee v. Burford, 156 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Ala. 1957) ; Wheeler
v. Kaiser, 45 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo. 1942). In 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), the princi-
pal postconviction remedy for federal prisoners, it is provided that: "The sentencing
court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motions for similar
relief on behalf of the same prisoner." See Smith v. United States, 267 F.2d 691
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
342 In the 84th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5649, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., 102 CONG. Rac. 940 (1956). In the 85th Congress, the House of
Representatives passed H.R. 8361, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REc. 4154 (daily
ed. March 18, 1958). In the 86th Congress, an identical bill was introduced as H.R.
3216, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). As reported by the House Judiciary Committee,
however, the former provisions were replaced by the language of the present bill.
H.R. REP. No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959).
343 The former proposal would have eliminated federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion in any case in which the questions presented could still be raised in a state pro-
ceeding or previously had been raised and determined in a state court or could have
been, but were not, presented at some past time to a state court, where there had
been a fair and adequate opportunity to do so.
344 See, e.g., the testimony of Judge Parker. Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 6, at 20 (1955). See also id. at 77; 102 CONG. R~c. 939 (1956); 104 CONG.
REc. 4151-53 (daily ed. March 18, 1958).
345 See H.R. REP. No. 548, supra note 342, at 12-13. The Judicial Conference
recommended that § 2254 of the Judicial Code be amended to provide that an appli-
cation for federal habeas corpus by a state prisoner should be entertained "only on
a ground which presents a substantial Federal constitutional question." H.R. 6742,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The same provision had appeared in the earlier bills.
346 Judge Orie L. Phillips recommended that this be eliminated and the following
substituted: "the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." Hearings on H.R. 6742, H.R. 4958, H.R.
3216, H.R. 2269 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 12 (1959).
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adopted and the bill, as passed by the House, is in no way an attack
upon the Freedom Writ. It represents rather an effort to improve
the practices of the courts within the existing jurisdiction. For the
reasons discussed above, however, it is believed that even this bill
should not be enacted into law.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to demonstrate something
of the meaning of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in the admin-
istration of state criminal law. No one will deny that the jurisdiction
has been an irritant to federal-state relations. But since the evidence
indicates that virtually all successful petitioners for federal habeas
corpus have never received a fair hearing in their state courts, the
treatment for that condition should be directed primarily toward the
state systems. This is not to say that there is no need for improve-
ment in the administration of the federal writ. Some of the serious
problems have been discussed. Others remain for consideration. The
vital point is that there be recognition of the present indispensability





There follows a chronological history of the 35 cases discussed in this Article
in which a state prisoner successfully attacked his conviction. The cases are listed
alphabetically. For each case, the history may be divided into three components:
original prosecution and direct appellate proceedings including any certiorari applica-
tions, state collateral proceedings, and federal habeas corpus litigation. Citations
to reported opinions or orders of the courts, where known, are given. A brief
reference is made in each case to the ultimately controlling federal question and the
manner in which it was raised in the state courts.
ALMEIDA Pennsylvania
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to death; motion
for new trial denied, Commonwealth v. Almeida, 66 Pa. D. & C. 351 (1948), aff'd,
362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in state supreme court denied with-
out hearing or opinion, May 26, 1950; certiorari denied, Pennsylvania ex rel. Almeida v.
Baldi, 340 U.S. 867 (1950).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 104
F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 195 F2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 904 (1953).
Dispositive federal question: Suppression of evidence by the prosecution. Sug-
gested in motion for new trial but not alleged as wilful action by the prosecution
until state habeas corpus petition.
BERRY Kentucky
State direct: Pleaded guilty to rape and received life sentence in 1954. No
appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied; affirmed,
Berry v. Gray, 299 S.W2d 124 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 986 (1957).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Berry v. Gray, 155 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Ky.
1957).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. Issue raised in state habeas
corpus proceeding.
BLAND Texas
State direct: Convicted after jury trial of burglary and being an habitual criminal
and sentenced to life imprisonment. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
had affirmed, and while a petition for rehearing was pending, the prisoner escaped
from custody. The affirmance was set aside and the appeal dismissed, Bland v.
State, 154 Tex. Crim. 3, 224 S.W.2d 479 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 938 (1950).
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus denied, Ex parte Bland, 154 Tex.
Crim. 511, 228 S.W2d 170 (1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950).
Federal habeas corpus: The first application was denied in 1952 without opinion.
The second was granted, Petition of Bland, 139 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. At the original trial, the de-
fendant asked for a continuance in order to get counsel, but the matter was probably
not framed in constitutional terms. The federal question was raised on appeal from
the conviction and in the state habeas corpus petition.
BOWERS Pennsylvania
State direct: Pleaded guilty in 1934 in Pennsylvania to charges of receiving stolen
goods and in 1938 to abduction of female child. These convictions were considered
subsequently in New York under an habitual criminal statute when Bowers, after
conviction in 1941 of attempted burglary, was deemed a fourth offender and sentenced
to a prison term of from 15 years to life. No appeal.
State collateral: Applications to the New York trial court for writ of error coram
nobis and resentencing were denied. In the Pennsylvania courts, a petition for writ
of error coram nobis was denied; the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts
denied leave to appeal; certiorari denied, Bowers v. Pennsylvania, 353 U.S. 967
(1957).
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Federal habeas corpus: Hearing ordered, New York ex rel. Bowers v. Fay,
157 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), granted, 171 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
aff'd sub nor. United States ex rel. Bowers v. Fay, 266 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1959).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel in Pennsylvania cases. First raised
after New York sentence in collateral proceedings in New York and Pennsylvania.
CAMINITO New York
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to life imprison-
ment; affirmed, People v. Caminito, 265 App. Div. 960, 38 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1942),
aff'd, 291 N.Y. 541, 50 N.E.2d 654 (1943). No petition for certiorari.
State collateral: Motion for reargument of appeal denied, 297 N.Y. 882, 79
N.E.2d 277 (1948). No petition for certiorari. Second motion for reargument
denied, 307 N.Y. 686, 120 N.E.2d 857 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839 (1954).
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 127
F. Supp. 689 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896
(1955).
Dispositive federal question: Coerced confession. Coercion litigated in original
prosecution and raised in motion for reargument.
CARMEN California
State direct: Convicted of murder and sentenced to death; on appeal, reversed,
People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 265 P.2d 900, rehearing granted and conviction
aff'd, 43 Cal. 2d 342, 273 P.2d 521 (1954). No petition for certiorari.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in state supreme court denied,
Application of Carmen, 48 Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957), cert. denied without
prejudice to an application for federal habeas corpus, 355 U.S. 924 (1958).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Petition of Carmen, 165 F. Supp. 942 (N.D.
Cal. 1958).
Dispositive federal question: Exclusive federal jurisdiction of the offense under
the Ten Major Crimes Act. The issue was raised in the state direct and collateral
proceedings.
COLLINS Pennsylvania
State direct: Convicted in 1931 as a burglar and habitual criminal upon a guilty
plea, and sentenced to prison for from 5 to 20 years. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied; affirmed,
Commonwealth ex rel. Collins v. Ashe, 159 Pa. Super. 553, 49 A.2d 265 (1946). No
petition for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, United States ex rel. Collins v. Ashe, 74 F.
Supp. 987 (W.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, 175 F.2d 555 (3d Cir.), denied,
80 F. Supp. 914 (W.D. Pa. 1948), vacated and renmanded, 176 F.2d 606 (3d Cir.
1949), denied, 90 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied; affirmed,
Commonwealth ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 170 Pa. Super. 199, 85 A.2d 663 (1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 954 (1952).
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 106 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D. Pa. 1952), reed, 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953).
Dispositive federal question: Failure to give notice of the applicability of the
state habitual criminal act. First raised in 1946 state habeas corpus proceedings.
CURRAN (MAGUIRE and JONES) Delaware
State direct: Conviction of rape after jury trial in 1948 with sentence of life
imprisonment. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in Superior Court denied. Curran v.
Wooley, 48 Del. 214, 101 A.2d 303 (1953), aff'd, 48 Del. 382, 104 A.2d 771 (1954).
No petition for certiorari. Motion to vacate sentence in Superior Court denied,
State v. Curran, 49 Del. 350, 116 A.2d 782 (1955), aft'd, 49 Del. 587, 122 A.2d 126,
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 913 (1956).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Curran v. Delaware, 154 F. Supp. 27 (D. Del.
1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 (1959).





State direct: Convicted in jury trial of uttering forged check and sentenced to 15
years in 1951. No appeal.
State collateral: Several petitions for habeas corpus were denied, all without
opinion. The last of these was denied by a trial-level court on July 11, 1956. The
state supreme court granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis but denied a request
for a transcript of the original trial at state expense and ultimately dismissed the
appeal. A petition for certiorari, filed prior to the dismissal of the appeal, was
denied, Daugharty v. Gladden, 352 U.S. 1009 (1957).
Federal habeas corpus: Several applications, interspersed with state habeas corpus
petitions, were denied. Only one was reported, Daugharty v. Gladden, 128 F. Supp. 95
(D. Ore. 1953). The final application was denied in the district court, Daugharty v.
Gladden, 150 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1957), rev'd, 257 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958).
Dispositive federal question: Denial of appeal in state postconviction proceeding.
Never raised in constitutional terms in the state courts.
DeVITA (and GRILLO) New Jersey
State direct: Convicted of murder in jury trial and sentenced to death; affirmed,
State v. Grillo, 11 N.J. 173, 93 A2d 328 (1952), cert. d'enied, 345 U.S. 976 (1953).
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in trial level court denied; affirmed,
In the Matter of DeVita, 27 N.J. Super. 101, 98 A.2d 716, aff'd, 13 N.J. 341, 99
A.2d 589 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954). Motion for new trial denied;
affirmed, State v. Grillo, 16 N.J. 103, 106 A.2d 294 (1954). No petition for
certiorari.
Federal habeas corpts: Denied by district court without opinion; reversed and
remanded, United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1954),
denied, 133 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1955), rev'd, 248 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 873 (1957).
Dispositive federal question: Failure of petit juror to reveal that he had recently
been the victim of an offense similar to the one in this case. First raised in motion
for new trial in 1954.
ELLISOR Texas
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to death;
affirmed, Ellisor v. Texas, 282 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1955). No peti-
tion for certiorari.
State collateral: Petitions for habeas corpus were denied by a trial-level court
and the Court of Criminal Appeals without reported opinions.
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Petition of Ellisor, 140 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.
Tex.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1956).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel at sentencing. First raised in state
collateral proceedings.
GARTON (and FREEMAN) Colorado
State direct: Pleaded guilty to kidnapping in 1945 and sentenced to from 25 to 29
years in prison. No appeal.
State collateral: Motion to vacate sentence (treated as petition for writ of error
coram nobis) denied; affirmed, Freeman v. Colorado, 128 Colo. 99, 260 P.2d 603
(1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 911 (1953).
Petition for habeas corpus, filed by Freeman alone, denied by county court;
affirmed, Freeman v. Tinsley, 135 Colo. 62, 308 P.2d 220, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 843
(1957).
Federal habeas corpus: Filed by Garton alone (Freeman having been granted
executive clemency) ; granted, Garton v. Tinsley, 171 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1959).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. First raised in state collateral
proceedings.
GOLDSBY Mississippi
State direct: Convicted of murder in jury trial and sentenced to death; affirmed,
Goldsby v. State, 226 Miss. 1, 78 So. 2d 762, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955).
State collateral: Petition for writ of error coram nobis or habeas corpus in state
supreme court denied, Goldsby v. State, 226 Miss. 20, 86 So. 2d 27, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 944 (1956).
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Federal habeas corpus: Denied without hearing in the district court; reversed
and remanded, United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249 F2d 417 (5th Cir.
1957) ; denied with oral opinion of the district court unpublished; reversed, 263 F.2d
71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838, 850 (1959).
Dispositive federal question: Racial discrimination in selection of the petit jury.
First raised in petition for certiorari following conviction and appeal.
GONZALES Washington
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial in 1950 and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Appeal noted but not perfected.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in Washington Supreme Court
denied without opinion; certiorari denied, Giron v. Cranor, 344 U.S. 847 (1952).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Giron v. Cranor, 116 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash.
1953), aff'd sub noin. Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 935 (1956).
Dispositive federal question: Coerced confession. Coercion was litigated in the
original trial, but possibly not in constitutional dimension. The coerced confession
was not among the contentions in the state habeas corpus petition.
GRANDSINGER Nebraska
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to death;
affirmed, Grandsinger v. State, 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955); petition for
rehearing denied; motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental petition
for rehearing granted but petition for rehearing denied without opinion; certiorari
denied, 352 U.S. 880 (1956).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Grandsinger v. Bovey, 153 F. Supp. 201 (D. Neb.
1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 917 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 929 (1958).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of effective assistance of counsel. First
raised in amended and supplemental petition for rehearing.
GREEN Maite
State direct: Convicted after jury trial of uttering forged instrument and sen-
tenced to from 5 to 10 years in prison. No appeal.
State collateral: Repeated applications are not traceable since no opinions were
ever published. Finally, a reasonably clear petition for habeas corpus was presented
to a single judge of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. An appeal from denial
of this petition to the court en banc was prevented by the lack of an in forma
pauperis procedure.
Federal habeas corpus: The first seven applications were denied, some with
instructions to the prisoner on exhaustion of state remedies. Published opinions
appear in Green v. Maine, 110 F. Supp. 240 (D. Me. 1952), 113 F. Supp. 253
(D. Me. 1953). The eighth application was granted, Green v. Robbins, 120 F. Supp.
61 (D. Me.), aff'd, 218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel at sentencing. First raised in state
collateral proceedings.
HOUSTON Missouri
State direct: Convicted of murder in 1940 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in Cole County Court granted in
1946. On motion of the prosecutor, the Mississippi County Court, in which the
judgment of conviction had been entered, "remanded" the petitioner to jail. Petition
for habeas corpus in the state supreme court; writ quashed in 1952; certiorari
denied, Houston v. Missouri, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953) (out of time).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Houston v. Eidson, 119 F. Supp. 778 (W.D.
Mo. 1954).
Dispositive federal question: Continued incarceration after state court had
granted habeas corpus relief. (The state court relied upon lack of effective assistance
of counsel.) Question probably raised in habeas corpus petition in the state supreme
court.
JOHNS Indiana
State direct: Pleaded guilty to charges of burglary and auto theft in 1946 and
sentenced to 25 years in prison. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for coram nobis denied; appeal dismissed as out of
time, Johns v. State, 227 Ind. 737, 89 N.E.2d 281 (1949). No petition for certiorari.
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Federal habeas corpus: Petition dismissed in 1950 because prisoner not then
serving challenged sentence. Granted, Johns v. Overlade, 122 F. Supp. 921 (N.D.
Ind. 1953).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. First raised in coram nobis
proceedings.
LEYRA New York
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to death; affirmed,
Leyra v. People, 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918
(1953).
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, Leyra v. Denno, 113 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
Dispositive federal question: Coerced confession. Raised in the original trial
and appellate proceedings.
LUNCE (and REYNOLDS) Indiana
State direct: Convicted of robbery after jury trial in 1952 and sentenced to from
10 to 25 years in prison.
State collateral: Delayed appeal allowed and conviction affirmed, Lunce v. State,
233 Ind. 685, 122 N.E.2d 5 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 960 (1955).
Federal habeas corpus: Denied by the district court without opinion; reversed
and remanded, Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); writ granted
without published opinion in the district court; affirmed, Lunce v. Dowd, 261 F.2d
351 (7th Cir. 1958).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of effective assistance of counsel. First raised
in delayed appeal.
MASSEY Texas
State direct: Convicted after trial by jury of robbery and assault in 1951 and
received mandatory sentence of life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. No appeal.
State collateral: Two petitions for habeas corpus were denied by a county
court; the former was not appealed while the latter was affirmed, Ex parte Massey,
149 Tex. Crim. 172, 191 S.W.2d 877, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 674 (1946).
Federal habeas corpus: A motion for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus
in the Supreme Court was denied, In re Massey, 327 U.S. 770 (1946); denial of
a subsequent application by the district court was affirmed, Massey v. Moore, 173
F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 837 (1949).
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in Court of Criminal Appeals denied,
although lower court to which case had been referred recommended relief, Ex parte
Massey, 157 Tex. Crim. 491, 249 S.W.2d 599 (1952). No petition for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Denied by the district court without opinion; affirmed,
Massey v. Moore, 205 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1953), rev'd and remanded, 348 U.S. 105
(1954), granted, 133 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel to represent a defendant insane
at time of trial. Counsel issue raised repeatedly in state collateral proceedings.
MILLS Illinois
State direct: Pleaded guilty to burglary in 1935 and sentenced, as an habitual
criminal, to life imprisonment
State collateral: Delayed appeal allowed by the Illinois Supreme Court and the
conviction affirmed without opinion in 1946; certiorari denied, Mills v. Ragen, 328
U.S. 846 (1946). Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied without opinion;
certiorari denied, Mills v. Ragen, 329 U.S. 770 (1946).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, United States ex rel. Mills v. Ragen, 77
F. Supp. 15 (N.D. II1. 1948).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel and coerced guilty plea. First
raised in delayed appeal.
MONTGOMERY (Ill.) Illinois
State direct: Convicted after a jury trial in 1924 of rape and sentenced to life
imprisonment. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied without
opinion; certiorari denied, Montgomery v. Ragen, 335 U.S. 836 (1948).
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Federal habeas corpus: Granted, United States ex ret. Montgomery v. Ragen,
86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. IIl. 1949).
Dispositive federal question: Suppression of evidence by the prosecution. First
raised in state habeas corpus proceeding.
MONTGOMERY (Mo.) Missouri
State direct: Pleaded guilty in 1941 to charges of robbery, kidnapping and auto
theft and received a sentence of life imprisonment. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in Cole County granted in 1945.
Petitioner "remanded" to prison by order of the court of St Francois County, the
court of the original conviction. Petition for habeas corpus in the state supreme
court denied, Montgomery v. Parker, 355 Mo. 245, 195 S.W.2d 745 (1946). No
petition for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Montgomery v. Eidson, 123 F. Supp. 292
(W.D. Mo. 1954).
Dispositive federal question: Continued incarceration after state court had granted
habeas corpus relief. (The Cole County Court held that the prisoner had been
denied counsel.) Question probably raised in habeas corpus proceeding in state
supreme court
MULLREED Michigan
State direct: Pleaded guilty in 1954 to unarmed robbery and received a sentence
of from 10 to 15 years. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied with opinion,
unpublished; the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal; certiorari denied,
Mullreed v. Michigan, 348 U.S. 975 (1955).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Mullreed v. Bannan, 137 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.
Mich. 1956).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. First raised in state habeas
corpus proceeding.
RHEA Tennessee
State direct: Convicted of habitual criminality, after offense of armed robbery,
and sentenced in 1950 to life imprisonment; appeal dismissed for want of a bill of
exceptions when court-appointed counsel in the trial court took no steps to perfect
an appeal.
State collateral: After two applications apparently submitted to the wrong
courts, a petition for habeas corpus was denied by a county criminal court; appeal
to the state supreme court was not perfected for lack of an appeal bond.
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 671 (M.D.
Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956).
Dispositive federal question: Absence of formal notice of applicability of habitual
criminal act. First raised in state collateral proceedings.
SA VINI Michigan
State direct: Pleaded guilty in 1943 in Michigan to charge of rape and sentenced
to from 72 to 15 years in prison. This conviction used in New York, after plea
of guilty to robbery offense in 1954, to sentence defendant as multiple offender
to prison for from 72 to 8 years. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for writ of error coram nobis in Michigan Circuit
Court denied in 1955. No appeal.
Federal habeas corpus: Denied by the district court without opinion. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for writ of error coram nobis in Michigan Circuit
Court denied; affirmed by Michigan Supreme Court in 1956. No petition for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, unpublished memorandum in district court;
affirmed, United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1957).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel at arraignment in Michigan rape
case. Raised in coram nobis proceedings in Michigan.
SHEFFIELD Louisiana
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to death in
1953. No appeal.
State collateral: Delayed motion for new trial returned as filed too late in 1954.
Petition for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition denied by state supreme
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
court in 1954; certiorari denied without prejudice to application for federal habeas
corpus, Sheffield v. Louisiana, 348 U.S. 850 (1954).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, United States ex rel. Sheffield v. Waller, 126
F. Supp. 537 (W.D. La. 1954), certificate of prob. cause denied, 224 F.2d 280 (5th
Cir.), cert. under 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (1958) denied, 350 U.S. 922 (1955).
Dispositive federal question: Numerous issues were involved, including primarily
lack of effective assistance of counsel, undue haste in holding the trial, and the
prejudicial effects of inflamed community emotions.
STONER Illinois
State direct: Pleaded guilty to burglary and larceny in 1943 and received a
sentence of life imprisonment. No appeal.
State collateral: Proceeding under Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act denied
by trial court; affirmed without opinion by state supreme court; certiorari denied,
Stoner v. Randolph, 348 U.S. 849 (1954).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, United States ex rel. Stoner v. Randolph,
165 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. Raised in state postconviction
proceeding.
THOMPSON Pennsylvania
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to death;
affirmed, Commonwealth v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A.2d 401, cert. denied 342
U.S. 835 (1951).
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 103
F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 429 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
960 (1953).
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in state supreme court denied without
opinion in 1953. No petition for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 113 F.
Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, 208 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1953), denied,
123 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Pa. 1954), rev'd, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 875 (1955).
Dispositive federal question: Suppression of evidence by the prosecution. First
raised in petition for habeas corpus in state supreme court.
TODD Indiana
State direct: Convicted after jury trial of auto theft and forgery and sentenced
to 10 years in prison on the former and from 2 to 14 years on the latter; affirmed,
Todd v. State, 226 Ind. 496, 81 N.E.2d 530, 784, 82 N.E.2d 407 (1948). No petition
for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Todd v. Dowd, 100 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Ind.
1949).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. First raised in motion for new
trial following conviction.
WADE New York
State direct: Convicted of murder after a jury trial and sentenced to death;
affirmed, People v. Wade, 265 App. Div. 867, 38 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1942), aff'd, 291
N.Y. 574, 50 N.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 789 (1943), motion for reargument
of appeal denied, 292 N.Y. 577, 54 N.E.2d 693 (1944).
State collateral: Petition for writ of error corane nobis denied in 1955; leave
to appeal in forma pauperis denied by the Appellate Division; leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals denied; appeal dismissed by the Appellate Division in 1956; cer-
tiorari denied, Wade v. New York, 352 U.S. 974 (1957) (out of time).
Federal habeas corpus: Denied, United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 144 F.
Supp. 458 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, 256 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 908
(1958). See also 153 F. Supp. 781 (N.D.N.Y. 1957), appeal dismissed, 256 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1958).
Dispositive federal question: Coerced confession. The issue of coercion was
litigated in the original prosecution, but not in the coram nobis proceeding or the
1957 petition for federal habeas corpus.
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WESTBROOK Ilijiwis
State direct: Convicted after jury trial of armed robbery, sentenced to life im-
prisonment in 1948, resentenced to 30-50 years' imprisonment in 1952. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied in 1949;
certiorari denied, Westbrook v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 960 (1949). Request for copy of
transcript and record of prosecution proceedings denied by trial court in 1950. On
writ of error to state supreme court, remanded for correction of sentence, People v.
Westbrook, 411 II1. 301, 103 N.E.2d 494 (1952). At resentencing, request for tran-
script again refused. Motion for new trial on ground of lack of transcript denied
in 1952. Petition under Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act dismissed; affirmed by
the state supreme court without opinion; certiorari denied, Westbrook v. Illinois,
349 U.S. 957 (1955). Petition for habeas corpus in county court denied; certiorari
denied, Westbrook v. Randolph, 352 U.S. 973 (1957).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted by the district court; modified, United States
ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1958). (The court of appeals
affirmed on the finding of denial of due process, but reversed the district court's
order and directed that the prisoner be remanded to state custody for six months
pending possible retrial.)
Dispositive federal question: Denial of transcript for appeal, reporter having
contracted multiple sclerosis before transcribing notes which have since been lost or
destroyed. The lack of a transcript was raised at several points in the state pro-
ceedings, particularly the Post-Conviction Procedure Act proceeding and the subse-
quent habeas corpus petition.
WHITE Indiana
State direct: Convicted of murder after jury trial and sentenced to life imprison-
ment; affirmed, White v. State, 219 Ind. 290, 37 N.E.2d 937 (1941). No petition
for certiorari.
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, White v. Dowd, 164 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Ind.
1958).
Dispositive federal question: Use of confession made by accomplice referring to
matters outside of the defendant's personal knowledge. Most likely classification
is coerced confession, although the only authorities cited by the district court concern
the right of confrontation and cross-examination. The federal question was never
raised in the state courts.
WOODS Pennsylvania
State direct: Pleaded guilty to armed robbery in 1947 and received a sentence
of from 20 to 40 years imprisonment. No appeal.
State collateral: Petition for habeas corpus denied by county court in 1953.
No appeal. Petition for habeas corpus denied by county court in 1956; appeal pre-
vented by lack of filing fee; certiorari denied, Woods v. Cavell, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
Federal habeas corpus: Granted, Pennsylvania ex rel. Woods v. Cavell, 157 F.
Supp. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1958).
Dispositive federal question: Lack of counsel. First raised in state habeas
corpus proceedings.
